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364 NLRB No. 90
NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the 
bound volumes of NLRB decisions.  Readers are requested to notify the Executive 
Secretary, National Labor Relations Board, Washington, D.C.  20570, of any 
typographical or other formal errors so that corrections can be included in the 
bound volumes.
The Trustees of Columbia University in the City of 
New York and Graduate Workers of Columbia–
GWC, UAW.  Case 02–RC–143012
August 23, 2016
DECISION ON REVIEW AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN PEARCE AND MEMBERS MISCIMARRA,
HIROZAWA, AND MCFERRAN
The threshold question before us is whether students 
who perform services at a university in connection with 
their studies are statutory employees within the meaning 
of Section 2(3) of the National Labor Relations Act.  
Here, after a hearing directed by the Board, the Regional 
Director applied Brown University, 342 NLRB 483 
(2004), where the Board found that graduate student as-
sistants were not employees within the meaning of Sec-
tion 2(3), and dismissed a petition filed by the Graduate 
Workers of Columbia-GWC, UAW, which seeks to rep-
resent both graduate and undergraduate teaching assis-
tants, as well as graduate research assistants.1  The Board 
granted review in this case on December 23, 2015, and 
then issued a notice and invitation to file briefs, identify-
ing the primary issue presented, as well as subsidiary 
issues that would follow if Brown University were over-
ruled.2  We have carefully considered the record, the 
                                               
1 The petition defined the bargaining unit sought as follows:
Included: All student employees who provide instructional services, 
including graduate and undergraduate Teaching Assistants (Teaching 
Assistants, Teaching Fellows, Preceptors, Course Assistants, Readers 
and Graders): All Graduate Research Assistants (including those 
compensated through Training Grants) and All Departmental Re-
search Assistants employed by the Employer at all of its facilities, in-
cluding Morningside Heights, Health Sciences, Lamont-Doherty and 
Nevis facilities. 
Excluded: All other employees, guards and supervisors as defined in 
the Act. 
2 On January 16, 2016, the Board invited the parties and interested 
amici to file briefs addressing the following four issues:
1.  Should the Board modify or overrule Brown University, 342 
NLRB 483 (2004), which held that graduate student assistants who 
perform services at a university in connection with their studies are not 
statutory employees within the meaning of Section 2(3) of the Nation-
al Labor Relations Act?
2.  If the Board modifies or overrules Brown University, supra, what 
should be the standard for determining whether graduate student assis-
tants engaged in research are statutory employees, including graduate 
student assistants engaged in research funded by external grants?  See 
New York University, 332 NLRB 1205, 1209 fn. 10 (2000) (relying on 
Leland Stanford Junior University, 214 NLRB 621 (1974)).
positions of the parties and the amici,3 the reasoning of 
the Brown University Board, and the views of our dis-
senting colleague, who endorses Brown University (as 
well as advancing arguments of his own).   
For the reasons that follow, we have decided to over-
rule Brown University, a sharply-divided decision, which 
itself overruled an earlier decision, New York University, 
332 NLRB 1205 (2000) (NYU).  We revisit the Brown 
University decision not only because, in our view, the 
Board erred as to a matter of statutory interpretation, but 
also because of the nature and consequences of that error.  
The Brown University Board failed to acknowledge that 
the Act does not speak directly to the issue posed here, 
which calls on the Board to interpret the language of the 
statute in light of its policies.  The Brown University
Board’s decision, in turn, deprived an entire category of 
workers of the protections of the Act, without a convinc-
ing justification in either the statutory language or the 
policies of the Act.  
As we will explain, our starting point in determining 
whether student assistants are covered by the Act is the 
broad language of Section 2(3), which provides in rele-
vant part that “[t]he term ‘employee’ shall include any 
employee,” subject to certain exceptions—none of 
which address students employed by their universities.4  
The Brown University Board held that graduate assistants 
cannot be statutory employees because they “are primari-
ly students and have a primarily educational, not eco-
nomic, relationship with their university.”5  We disagree.  
The Board has the statutory authority to treat student 
assistants as statutory employees, where they perform 
work, at the direction of the university, for which they 
                                                                          
3.  If the Board concludes that graduate student assistants, terminal 
masters degree students and undergraduate students are statutory em-
ployees, would a unit composed of all these classifications be appro-
priate?
4.  If the Board concludes that graduate student assistants, terminal 
masters degree students and undergraduate students are statutory em-
ployees, what standard should the Board apply to determine whether 
they constitute temporary employees? 
3 Briefs were filed in support of the Petitioner by: American Asso-
ciation of University Professors (AAUP); American Federation of 
Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO); American 
Federation of Teachers (AFT); Ellen Dannin, Attorney; The General 
Counsel of the NLRB; Individual Academic Professors of Social Sci-
ence and Labor Studies (IAP); National Association of Graduate-
Professional Students (NAGPS); Service Employees International 
Union and Committee of Interns and Resident, SEIU Healthcare 
(SEIU-CIR); and United Steelworkers (USW).  Filing in support of 
Columbia were: American Council on Education (ACE), et al.; Brown 
University et al.; Higher Education Council of the Employment Law 
Alliance (HEC); and National Right to Work Legal Defense and Educa-
tion Foundation (NRW).
4 29 U.S.C. §152(3).
5 Brown University, 342 NLRB at 487.
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are compensated.  Statutory coverage is permitted by 
virtue of an employment relationship; it is not foreclosed 
by the existence of some other, additional relationship 
that the Act does not reach.
The unequivocal policy of the Act, in turn, is to “en-
courag[e] the practice and procedure of collective bar-
gaining” and to “protect[ ] the exercise by workers of full 
freedom of association, self-organization, and designa-
tion of representatives of their own choosing.”6  Given 
this policy, coupled with the very broad statutory defini-
tions of both “employee” and “employer,” it is appropri-
ate to extend statutory coverage to students working for 
universities covered by the Act unless there are strong 
reasons not to do so.7  We are not persuaded by the 
Brown University Board’s self-described “fundamental 
belief that the imposition [sic] of collective bargaining on 
graduate students would improperly intrude into the edu-
cational process and would be inconsistent with the pur-
poses and policies of the Act.”8  This “fundamental be-
lief” is unsupported by legal authority, by empirical evi-
dence, or by the Board’s actual experience.  
Thus, we hold today that student assistants who have a 
common-law employment relationship with their univer-
sity are statutory employees under the Act.  We will ap-
ply that standard to student assistants, including assis-
tants engaged in research funded by external grants.  Ap-
plying the new standard to the facts here, consistent with 
the Board’s established approach in representation cases,
we conclude (1) that all of the petitioned-for student-
assistant classifications consist of statutory employees; 
(2) that the petitioned-for bargaining unit (comprising 
graduate students, terminal Master’s degree students, and 
undergraduate students) is an appropriate unit; and (3) 
that none of the petitioned-for classifications consists of
temporary employees who may not be included in the 
unit.  Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the Re-
gional Director and remand the proceedings to the Re-
gional Director for further appropriate action. 
                                               
6 29 U.S.C. §151.
7 Cf. NLRB v. Kentucky River Community Care, Inc., 532 U.S. 706, 
711–712 (2001) (upholding Board’s rule allocating burden of proof to 
party asserting supervisory exception to Sec. 2(3), citing broad defini-
tion of “employee”).
8 342 NLRB at 493.  Under the Act, collective bargaining can never 
be “imposed” on employees by the Board; rather, the Act guarantees 
employees full freedom of choice in deciding whether or not to seek 
union representation, based on majority support.  See National Labor 
Relations Act, §§1, 7, & 9, 29 U.S.C. §§151, 157, 159.
I. OVERVIEW OF PRECEDENT
A. Board precedent prior to Brown University
The Board has exercised jurisdiction over private, 
nonprofit universities for more than 45 years.9  During 
that time, the Board has permitted collective bargaining 
by faculty members at private universities and has had 
frequent occasion to apply the Act in the university set-
ting.10  The Board first considered the status of graduate 
student assistants in Adelphi University, 195 NLRB 639 
(1972).  There, the Board held that graduate assistants 
should be excluded from a bargaining unit of university 
faculty members because they did not share a community 
of interest with the faculty.  However, the Adelphi Board 
did not address whether the student assistants were statu-
tory employees.  Two years later, the Board held that 
certain university research assistants were “primarily 
students” and thus not statutory employees, observing 
that the relationship between the research assistants and 
the university was “not grounded on the performance of 
a given task where both the task and the time of its per-
formance is designated and controlled by an employer.”  
The Leland Stanford Junior University, 214 NLRB 621, 
623 (1974).  For similar reasons, the Board dismissed 
representation petitions for house staff at teaching hospi-
tals in Cedars-Sinai Medical Center, 223 NLRB 251 
(1976) and St. Clare’s Hospital, 229 NLRB 1000 
(1977).11  
In Boston Medical Center, 330 NLRB 152 (1999), the 
Board overruled Cedars-Sinai and St. Clare’s Hospital
and held that interns, residents, and clinical fellows 
(house staff) at a teaching hospital were statutory em-
ployees entitled to engage in collective bargaining with 
the hospital over the terms and conditions of their em-
ployment.  In so holding, the Board emphasized the 
broad scope of Section 2(3) and noted the absence of any 
statutory exclusion for students or house staff.  And, con-
trary to St. Clare’s Hospital, in Boston Medical Center
the Board found that the policies of the Act would be 
advanced by extending full statutory protection to house 
staff.12    
The Board first held that certain university graduate 
assistants were statutory employees in its 2000 decision 
in NYU, supra.  In NYU, the Board examined the statuto-
ry language of Section 2(3) and the common law agency 
                                               
9 See Cornell University, 183 NLRB 329 (1970).
10 See, e.g., Bradford College, 261 NLRB 565 (1982).
11 In St. Clare’s Hospital, the Board clarified Cedars-Sinai, observ-
ing that “national labor policy . . . preclude[d] the extension of collec-
tive-bargaining rights and obligations to situations such as the one” 
presented, which implicated predominantly academic, not economic, 
interests.  229 NLRB at 1002.  
12 330 NLRB at 160.
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doctrine of the conventional master-servant relationship, 
which establishes that such a “relationship exists when a 
servant performs services for another, under the other’s 
control or right of control, and in return for payment.”13  
In so doing, the Board determined that “ample evidence 
exists to find that graduate assistants plainly and literally 
fall within the meaning of ‘employee’ as defined in Sec-
tion 2(3)” and by the common law.14  The Board’s inter-
pretation was based on the breadth of the statutory lan-
guage, the lack of any statutory exclusion for graduate 
assistants, and the undisputed facts establishing that the 
assistants in that case performed services under the con-
trol and direction of the university for which they were 
compensated.
The NYU Board also relied on Boston Medical Center
to support its policy determination that collective bar-
gaining was feasible in the university context.15  In Bos-
ton Medical Center, the Board held that interns, residents 
and clinical fellows (collectively, house staff) at a teach-
ing hospital were statutory employees entitled to engage 
in collective bargaining with the hospital over the terms 
and conditions of their employment.16  After 16 years, 
Boston Medical Center remains good law today—with 
no evidence of the harm to medical education predicted 
by the dissenters there—but NYU was overruled only a 
few years after it was decided, by a sharply divided 
Board’s 2004 decision in Brown University.
B. Brown University
In Brown University, the majority described NYU as 
“wrongly decided,” and invoked what it called the “un-
derlying fundamental premise of the Act,” i.e. that the 
Act is “designed to cover economic relationships.”17  The 
Board further relied on its “longstanding rule” that the 
Board will decline to exercise its jurisdiction “over rela-
tionships that are ‘primarily educational.’” 18  In so decid-
ing, the Brown University majority rejected NYU’s reli-
ance on the existence of a common-law employment 
relationship between the graduate students and the uni-
versity, stating that “[e]ven assuming arguendo” such a 
relationship existed, “it does not follow that [the graduate 
assistants] are employees within the meaning of the 
Act.”19  That issue was “not to be decided purely on the 
basis of older common-law concepts,” but rather by de-
termining “whether Congress intended to cover the indi-
                                               
13 332 NLRB at 1206.
14 Id. 
15 Id.
16 330 NLRB at 164-65.
17 342 NLRB at 483, 488.
18 Id. at 488.  
19 Id. at 491. 
vidual in question.”20  Disavowing the need for empirical 
analysis, the Brown University majority instead relied on 
what it perceived to be a fundamental tenet of the Act 
and a prerequisite to statutory coverage: a relationship 
that is primarily economic in character, regardless of 
whether it constitutes common-law employment.  
In addition to its declaration that graduate assistants, as 
primarily students, were necessarily excluded from statu-
tory coverage, the Brown University Board also articulat-
ed a policy rationale based almost exclusively on the 
overruled decision in St. Clare’s Hospital, supra, finding 
that the St. Clare’s Board had correctly “determined that 
collective bargaining is not particularly well suited to 
educational decisionmaking and that any change in em-
phasis from quality education to economic concerns will 
‘prove detrimental to both labor and educational poli-
cies.’”21  That determination ostensibly was supported by 
several factors: (1) that the student-teacher relationship is 
based on mutual academic interests, in contrast to the 
conflicting economic interests that inform the employer-
employee relationship; (2) that the educational process is 
a personal one, in contrast to the group character of col-
lective bargaining; (3) that the goal of collective bargain-
ing, promoting equality of bargaining power, is “largely 
foreign to higher education”; and (4) that collective bar-
gaining would “unduly infringe upon traditional academ-
ic freedoms.”22  
The Brown University dissenters, in stark contrast, 
noted that “[c]ollective bargaining by graduate student 
employees” was “increasingly a fact of American univer-
sity life” and described the majority’s decision as “woe-
fully out of touch with contemporary academic reality.” 
23  According to the dissenters, the majority had misap-
plied the appropriate statutory principles and erred “in 
seeing the academic world as somehow removed from
the economic realm that labor law addresses.”24  The 
dissenters emphasized that the majority’s decision im-
properly disregarded “the plain language of the statute—
which defines ‘employees’ so broadly that graduate stu-
dents who perform services for, and under the control of, 
their universities are easily covered” and instead chose to 
exclude student assistants.25  This decision was based on 
“policy concerns . . . not derived from the Act at all,” 
reflecting “an abstract view of what is best for American 
higher education—a subject far removed from the 
                                               
20 Id., citing NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267 (1974).
21 Id. at 489, citing 229 NLRB at 1002.
22 Id. at 489–490.
23 Id. at 493 (dissent of Member Liebman and Member Walsh).
24 Id. at 494.
25 Id. at 493.
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Board’s expertise.”26 Contrary to the majority, the dis-
senters concluded, in line with the Board’s decision in 
NYU, that the terms and conditions of graduate-student 
employment were adaptable to collective bargaining (as 
illustrated by experience at public-sector universities and 
at New York University itself) and that empirical evi-
dence contradicted claims that “academic freedom” and 
educational quality were harmed by permitting collective 
bargaining.27
We believe that the NYU Board and the Brown Univer-
sity dissenters were correct in concluding that student 
assistants who perform work at the direction of their uni-
versity for which they are compensated are statutory em-
ployees.  That view better comports with the language of 
Section 2(3) of the Act and common-law agency princi-
ples, the clear policy of the Act, and the relevant empiri-
cal evidence.28
II. DISCUSSION
A. The Brown University Board Erred by Determining 
that, as a Matter of Statutory Interpretation, Student As-
sistants Could Not Be Treated as Statutory Employees 
For reasons already suggested, the NYU Board was on 
very firm legal ground in concluding that student assis-
tants could be employees of the university within the 
meaning of Section 2(3) of the Act, while also being stu-
dents—and thus permitting collective bargaining when 
student assistants freely choose union representation.29  
We now reaffirm that approach.  Where student assis-
tants have an employment relationship with their univer-
sity under the common law test—which they do here—
this relationship is sufficient to establish that the student 
assistant is a Section 2(3) employee for all statutory pur-
poses.  We do not hold that the Board is required to find 
workers to be statutory employees whenever they are 
common-law employees, but only that the Board may 
and should find here that student assistants are statutory 
employees.30
                                               
26 Id. at 497.
27 Id. at 499–500.
28 Leading scholars of labor law have long agreed with this view.  
See, e.g., Michael C. Harper, Judicial Control of the National Labor 
Relations Board’s Lawmaking in the Age of Chevron and Brand X, 89 
B.U. L. Rev. 189, 222 (2009) (“In Brown, the Board majority departed 
from the most relevant precedent, effectively refused to engage any 
available evidence, and disagreed with the dissenters and with the New 
York University decision in a way that vitiated any claim for special 
deference to its expertise in labor relations.”).  See also Catherine L. 
Fisk & Deborah C. Malamud, The NLRB in Administrative Law Exile: 
Problems with Its Structure and Functions and Suggestions for Reform, 
58 Duke L. J. 2013, 2076–2077 (2009).
29 New York University, supra, 332 NLRB at 1206.  
30 Cf. NLRB v. Town & Country Electric, 516 U.S. 85, 94 (1995)
(observing that “[i]n some cases, there may be a question about whether 
the Board’s departure from the common law of agency with respect to 
1. Section 2(3)
Section 2(3) of the Act defines “employee” to “include 
any employee,” subject to certain specified exceptions.31  
The Supreme Court has observed that the “breadth of 
[Section] 2(3)’s definition is striking: the Act squarely 
applies to ‘any employee.’”32  The “phrasing of the Act,” 
the Court has pointed out, “seems to reiterate the breadth 
of the ordinary dictionary definition” of the term, a defi-
nition that “includes any ‘person who works for another 
in return for financial or other compensation.’”33    
The Court has made clear, in turn, that the “task of de-
fining the term ‘employee’ is one that ‘has been assigned 
primarily to the agency created by Congress to adminis-
ter the Act,’” the Board.34    
None of the exceptions enumerated in Section 2(3) ad-
dresses students generally, student assistants in particu-
lar, or private university employees of any sort.35  The 
absence of student assistants from the Act’s enumeration 
of categories excluded from the definition of employee is 
itself strong evidence of statutory coverage.36  Although 
Section 2(3) excludes “individuals employed . . . by any
. . . person who is not an employer . . . as defined” in 
Section 2(2) of the Act, private universities do not fall 
within any of the specified exceptions, and, indeed, as 
previously noted, the Board has chosen to exercise juris-
diction over private, nonprofit universities for more than 
45 years.37  
The Act does not offer a definition of the term “em-
ployee” itself.  But it is well established that “when Con-
gress uses the term ‘employee’ in a statute that does not 
define the term, courts interpreting the statute ‘must in-
fer, unless the statute otherwise dictates, that Congress 
means to incorporate the established meaning’” of the 
                                                                          
particular questions and in a particular statutory context, renders its 
interpretation unreasonable,” but finding no such issue presented be-
cause the “Board’s interpretation of the term ‘employee’ [was] con-
sistent with the common law”). See also Office Employees Int’l Union, 
Local No. 11 v. NLRB, 353 U.S. 313 (1957) (Board lacked discretion to 
refuse to assert jurisdiction over labor unions as employers, in face of  
clear Congressional expression in Sec. 2(2) of Act, defining “employ-
er” to exclude “any labor organization (other than when acting as an 
employer)”).
31 29 U.S.C. § 152(3).
32 Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, 467 U.S. 883, 891 (1984).
33 Town & Country Electric, supra, 516 U.S. at 90, quoting Ameri-
can Heritage Dictionary 604 (3d ed. 1992).   
34 Sure-Tan, Inc., supra, 467 U.S. at 891, quoting NLRB v. Hearst 
Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. 111, 130 (1944).
35 Nor is the employee status of students mentioned anywhere else in 
the Act. Thus, “Congress has not directly addressed the precise ques-
tion at issue” in this case.  Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources 
Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984).
36 See Sure-Tan, Inc., supra, at 891–892.
37 See Cornell University, supra, 183 NLRB at 331–333, overruling 
Trustees of Columbia University, 97 NLRB 424 (1951).
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term, with reference to “‘common-law agency doc-
trine.’”38  Not surprisingly, then, the Supreme Court has 
endorsed the Board’s determination that certain workers 
were statutory employees where that determination 
aligned with the common law of agency.39  Other federal 
courts have done so as well.40  In accordance with the 
statute’s broad definition and with the Supreme Court’s 
approval, the Board has interpreted the expansive lan-
guage of Section 2(3) to cover, for example, paid union 
organizers (salts) employed by a company,41 undocu-
mented aliens,42 and “confidential” employees,43 among 
other categories of workers.   
The most notable instance in which apparent common-
law employees were found not to be employees under the 
Act, in spite of the absence of an explicit statutory exclu-
sion, is the exception that proves the rule.  In Bell Aero-
space, cited by the Brown University Board, the Supreme 
Court held that “managerial employees” were not cov-
ered by the Act because Congress had clearly implied 
their exclusion by the Act’s design and purpose to facili-
tate fairness in collective bargaining.44  As the Court 
concluded, giving employee status to managers would be 
contrary to this purpose:  it would place managers, who 
would be expected to be on the side of the employer in 
bargaining, and non-managerial employees in the same 
bargaining “camp,” “eviscerat[ing] the traditional dis-
tinction between labor and management.”45  The exclu-
sion of managers rested on legislative history, along with 
                                               
38 Town & Country Electric, supra, 516 U.S. at 94, quoting Nation-
wide Mutual Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 322–323 (1992).  
39 Id. at 94–95 (rejecting employer’s argument that common law 
principles precluded Board’s determination that paid union organizers, 
salts, were statutory employees, and holding that salts fell within rea-
sonable construction of common law definition).  
40 See, e.g., Lancaster Symphony Orchestra v. NLRB, 822 F.3d 563
(D.C. Cir. 2016), enfg. 357 NLRB 1761 (2011) (musicians in a regional 
orchestra are statutory employees); Seattle Opera v. NLRB, 292 F.3d 
757, 761–762 (D.C. Cir. 2002), enfg. 331 NLRB 1072 (2000) (opera 
company’s auxiliary choristers are statutory employees).  The Board 
has consistently applied common-law principles in its application of 
other concepts under the Act, including the Act’s broad definition of an 
employer.  See, e.g., Browning-Ferris Industries, 362 NLRB No. 186 
(2016) (test for joint-employer status).
41 Town & Country Electric, supra, 516 U.S. at 94 & 97–98 (com-
mon-law principles supported Board’s construction of the term “em-
ployee” to include salts).
42 Sure-Tan, supra, 467 U.S. at 892 (observing that undocumented 
aliens are “not among the few groups of workers expressly exempted 
by Congress” from the definition of “employee” and that “extending 
the coverage of the Act to [them] is consistent with the Act’s avowed 
purpose of encouraging and protecting the collective-bargaining pro-
cess”).
43 NLRB v. Hendricks County Rural Electric Membership Corp., 454 
U.S. 170, 189–190 (1981).
44 NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 275 (1974).
45 Id. at 284 fn. 13.
the intrinsic purpose and structure of the Act.  No legisla-
tive history supports excluding student assistants from 
statutory coverage, nor does the design of the Act itself.46
2. The Brown Board Did Not Adequately Consider the 
Text of Section 2(3) 
The Brown University Board insisted that Section 2(3) 
of the Act must not be examined in isolation; rather, the 
Board must “look to the underlying fundamental premise 
of the Act, viz. the Act is designed to cover economic 
relationships.”47  Certainly, the Supreme Court has sug-
gested that, despite the centrality of common-law agency 
principles to employee status under the Act, “[i]n doubt-
ful cases resort must still be had to economic and policy 
considerations to infuse [Section] 2(3) with meaning.”48  
But we reject the Brown University Board’s claim that 
finding student assistants to be statutory employees, 
where they have a common-law employment relationship 
with their university, is somehow incompatible with the 
“underlying fundamental premise of the Act.”  The Act is
designed to cover a particular type of “economic rela-
tionship” (in the Brown University Board’s phrase)—an 
employment relationship—and where that relationship 
exists, there should be compelling reasons before the 
Board excludes a category of workers from the Act’s 
coverage.  
The fundamental error of the Brown University Board 
was to frame the issue of statutory coverage not in terms 
of the existence of an employment relationship, but ra-
ther on whether some other relationship between the em-
ployee and the employer is the primary one—a standard 
neither derived from the statutory text of Section 2(3) nor 
from the fundamental policy of the Act.49  Indeed, in 
                                               
46 Contrary to Columbia’s assertion, the fact that Congress has not 
enacted legislation to countermand the Board’s Brown decision carries 
little weight.  One is not to infer legislative intent based on Congress’s 
seeming acquiescence to an agency decision unless there is evidence 
that Congress actually considered the precise agency action at issue.  
Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook Cty. v. Army Corps of Engineers, 
531 U.S. 159, 169–170, fn. 5 (2001).  For this reason, we do not rely 
today on the fact that Congress took no action to overrule the Board’s 
earlier decision in NYU.
47 342 NLRB at 488.
48 Allied Chemical & Alkali Workers v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass, 404 
U.S. 157, 168 (1971). 
49 Columbia also argues for our adoption of another, similar non-
common-law standard:  the “primary beneficiary” analysis used by the 
courts in some Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) cases, including cases 
involving the employee status of student interns.  Because the FLSA 
definition of a statutory employee is not tethered to the common law (as 
the Act’s definition is), and because the FLSA reflects policy goals 
distinct from those of the Act, we are not persuaded that the “primary 
beneficiary” analysis should govern this case.  For the same reason, we 
are not persuaded by Columbia’s contention that the Department of 
Labor’s recent guidance regarding whether graduate research assistants 
are employees within the meaning of the FLSA bears on the separate
5
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spite of the Brown University Board’s professed adher-
ence to “Congressional policies,” we can discern no such 
policies that speak to whether a common-law employee 
should be excluded from the Act because his or her em-
ployment relationship co-exists with an educational or 
other non-economic relationship.50  The Board and the 
courts have repeatedly made clear that the extent of any 
required “economic” dimension to an employment rela-
tionship is the payment of tangible compensation.  Even 
when such an economic component may seem compara-
tively slight, relative to other aspects of the relationship 
between worker and employer, the payment of compen-
sation, in conjunction with the employer’s control, suf-
fices to establish an employment relationship for purpos-
es of the Act.51  Indeed, the principle that student assis-
tants may have a common-law employment relationship 
with their universities—and should be treated according-
ly—is recognized in other areas of employment law as 
well.52
                                                                          
question of whether student assistants who have a common-law em-
ployment relationship with their universities should be regarded as 
employees under the NLRA.
50 Our dissenting colleague observes that an “array of federal statutes 
and regulations apply to colleges and universities,” but he does not 
identify any statute or regulation that speaks directly (or even indirect-
ly) to the key question here. That Congress is interested in supporting 
and regulating postsecondary education, as it surely is, does not demon-
strate a Congressional view on whether or how the NLRA should be 
applied to student assistants.  
Nor does our colleague identify any potential for conflict between 
the Act’s specific requirements and those of federal education law—
with one possible exception, related to educational records, which we 
address below.  See fn. 93, infra.  That application of the Act in some 
specific respect might require accommodation to another federal law 
cannot mean that the Board must refrain from applying the Act, at all, 
to an entire class of statutory employers or statutory employees.  Cf. 
Sure-Tan, Inc., supra, 467 U.S. at 89–893, 903–904 (affirming Board’s 
holding that undocumented workers were statutory employees under 
NLRA, but concluding that federal immigration law precluded award-
ing certain remedies for periods when workers were not legally entitled 
to be present and employed in United States).  See generally Vimar 
Seguros y Reaseguros, S.A. v. M/V Sky Reefer, 515 U.S. 528, 533 
(1995) (“[W]hen two statutes are capable of co-existence … it is the 
duty of the courts, absent a clearly expressed congressional intention to 
the contrary, to regard each as effective.”) (quotations omitted).
51 See Town & Country Electric, supra, 516 U.S. at 88, 95 (although 
chief purpose of union salts seeking employment was to organize and 
form a union, not to benefit economically, they were nonetheless em-
ployees as they were both paid and controlled by the company with 
respect to ordinary workplace duties); Seattle Opera Assn., 331 NLRB 
1072, 1073 (2000) (observing that while auxiliary choristers received 
some nonmonetary benefit in the form of personal satisfaction at their 
involvement in the opera, which is characteristic of a volunteer rela-
tionship, they also received monetary compensation for their effort, and 
this fact, along with employer control, made them employees under the 
Act), enfd. 292 F.3d 757 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
52 For purposes of employment law, student assistants cannot be fair-
ly categorized as “volunteers,” rather than employees.  See Restatement 
of Employment Law §1.02 (“An individual is a volunteer and not an 
In sum, we reject the Brown Board’s focus on whether 
student assistants have a “primarily educational” em-
ployment relationship with their universities.53  The Su-
preme Court has cautioned that “vague notions of a stat-
ute’s ‘basic purpose’ are . . . inadequate to overcome the 
words of its text regarding the specific issue under con-
sideration.”54  The crucial statutory text here, of course, 
is the broad language of Section 2(3) defining “employ-
ee” and the language of Section 8(d) defining the duty to 
bargain collectively.  It seems clear to us, then, that the 
Act’s text supports the conclusion that student assistants 
who are common-law employees are covered by the Act, 
unless compelling statutory and policy considerations 
require an exception.  As we explain next, the relevant 
considerations strongly favor statutory coverage.
B. Asserting Jurisdiction over Student Assistants Pro-
motes the Goals of Federal Labor Policy 
1. Overview of Federal Labor Policy
Federal labor policy, in the words of Section 1 of the 
Act, is to “encourag[e] the practice and procedure of col-
lective bargaining,” and to protect workers’ “full free-
dom” to express a choice for or against collective-
                                                                          
employee if the individual renders uncoerced services to a principal 
without being offered a material inducement”). As the Restatement 
explains, “[w]here an educational institution compensates student assis-
tants for performing services that benefit the institution, . . . such com-
pensation encourages the students to do the work for more than educa-
tional benefits and thereby establishes an employment as well as an 
educational relationship.”  Id., comment g.  The Restatement illustrates 
this principle with the following example:
A is a graduate student in biochemistry at university P.  In order to 
complete the degree requirements, A must work in a laboratory under 
P’s auspices, either for pay or as a volunteer.  A works in the laborato-
ry of a professor, for which A is paid a yearly stipend and given full 
tuition remission.  The professor has secured grants to support the re-
search that A is assisting. A is an employee of P.  P is providing A with 
significant benefits both in order to further A’s education and also to 
obtain A’s services on P’s funded research.
Id., illustration 10 (emphasis added).
53 The Brown University Board insisted that “there is a significant 
risk, and indeed a strong likelihood, that the collective-bargaining pro-
cess will be detrimental to the educational process” and announced that 
the Board would “decline to take these risks with our nation’s excellent 
private educational system.”  342 NLRB at 493. The Board’s state-
ment—coupled not only with the absence of any experiential or empiri-
cal basis for it, but also with the remarkable assertion that no such basis 
was required—strongly suggests that the Board acted based on little 
more than its own view of what was best for private universities.  “No 
one in Congress,” an academic critic of Brown University has written, 
“would have wanted the Board to determine which workers may be 
protected by the Act on the basis of mere suppositions without consid-
eration of how statutory or other goals would be served in practice by 
exclusion or coverage.” Michael C. Harper, Judicial Control of the 
National Labor Relations Board’s Lawmaking in the Age of Chevron
and Brand X, 89 B. U. L. Rev. 189, 220 (2009).  
54 Mertens v. Hewitt Associates, 508 U.S. 248, 261 (1993) (emphasis 
in original).
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bargaining representation.  Permitting student assistants 
to choose whether they wish to engage in collective bar-
gaining—not prohibiting it—would further the Act’s 
policies.  
Although the Brown University Board held that student 
assistants were not statutory employees, it also observed 
that, even assuming they were, the Board would have 
“discretion to determine whether it would effectuate na-
tional labor policy to extend collective bargaining rights” 
to student assistants and that, in fact, it would “not effec-
tuate the purposes and policies of the Act to do so.”55  
We disagree not with the claim that the Board has some 
discretion in this area,56 but with the conclusion reached 
by the Brown University Board, including its view that 
“empirical evidence” is irrelevant to the inquiry.57  We 
have carefully considered the arguments marshaled by 
the Board majority in Brown University (as well as the 
arguments advanced here by Columbia and supporting 
amici, as well as our dissenting colleague), but find that 
they do not outweigh the considerations that favor ex-
tending statutory coverage to student assistants.
The claims of the Brown majority are almost entirely 
theoretical.  The Brown University Board failed to 
demonstrate that collective bargaining between a univer-
sity and its employed graduate students cannot coexist 
successfully with student-teacher relationships, with the 
educational process, and with the traditional goals of 
higher education.  Labor law scholars have aptly criti-
cized the Brown University decision as offering “no em-
pirical support” for its claims, even though “those asser-
tions are empirically testable.”58    
The National Labor Relations Act, as we have repeat-
edly emphasized, governs only the employee-employer 
relationship.  For deciding the legal and policy issues in 
this case, then, it is not dispositive that student-teacher 
relationship involves different interests than the employ-
ee-employer relationship; that the educational process is 
individual, while collective bargaining is focused on the 
group; and that promoting equality of bargaining power 
is not an aim of higher education.  Even conceded, all 
                                               
55 342 NLRB at 492 (emphasis added).
56 However, in exercising this discretion, we tread carefully and with 
an eye toward the Act’s purposes.  In Northwestern University, 362 
NLRB No. 167 (2015), we denied the protections of the Act to certain 
college athletes—without ruling on their employee status—because, 
due to their situation within and governance by an athletic consortium 
dominated by public universities, we found that our extending coverage 
to them would not advance the purposes of the Act.  Here, conversely, 
we have no reason to believe that extending bargaining rights will not 
meaningfully advance the goals of the Act.  
57 342 NLRB at 492–493.
58 Catherine L. Fisk & Deborah C. Malamud, The NLRB in Adminis-
trative Exile: Problems with Its Structure and Function and Sugges-
tions for Reform, 58 Duke L. J. 2013, 2076–2077 (2009).   
these points simply confirm that collective bargaining 
and education occupy different institutional spheres.  In 
other words, a graduate student may be both a student 
and an employee; a university may be both the student’s 
educator and employer.  By permitting the Board to de-
fine the scope of mandatory bargaining over “wages, 
hours, and other terms and conditions of employment,” 
the Act makes it entirely possible for these different roles 
to coexist—and for genuine academic freedom to be pre-
served.  It is no answer to suggest, as the Brown Univer-
sity Board did, that permitting student assistants to bar-
gain over their terms and conditions of employment (no 
more and no less) somehow poses a greater threat to aca-
demic freedom than permitting collective bargaining by 
non-managerial faculty members, “[b]ecause graduate 
student assistants are students.”59  That the academic-
employment setting poses special issues of its own—as 
the Board and the Supreme Court have both recog-
nized60—does not somehow mean that the Act cannot 
properly be applied there at all.
2. Applying the Act to Student Assistants Would Not 
Infringe upon First Amendment Academic Freedom
The Brown University Board endorsed the view that 
“collective bargaining would unduly infringe upon tradi-
tional academic freedoms,” citing the “right to speak 
freely in the classroom” and a list of “traditional academ-
ic decisions” including “course length and content, 
standards for advancement and graduation, [and] admin-
istration of exams.”61  Insofar as the concept of academic 
freedom implicates the First Amendment, the Board cer-
tainly must take any such infringement into account.62  
But there is little, if any, basis here to conclude that treat-
ing employed graduate students as employees under the 
Act would raise serious constitutional questions, much 
less violate the First Amendment.  
The Supreme Court has made clear that academic 
freedom, in the constitutional sense, involves freedom 
from government efforts “to control or direct the content
                                               
59 342 NLRB at 490 fn. 26.
60 See NLRB v. Yeshiva University, 444 U.S. 672, 680-681 (1980), 
citing Syracuse University, 204 NLRB 641, 643 (1973) (permitting law 
school faculty to vote separately from other university faculty members 
on questions of representation, based on divergent professional inter-
ests).  In Syracuse University, the Board observed that in the “academic 
world,” the “basic interests recognized by the Act remain the same, but 
their interrelationship, the employer-employee relationship, and even 
the employee-employee relationship, does not squarely fit the industrial 
model.”  204 NLRB at 643.
61 342 NLRB at 490, citing St. Clare’s Hospital, supra, 229 NLRB at 
1003.
62 Cf. NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 U.S. 490 (1979) 
(declining to construe Act as authorizing Board to exercise jurisdiction 
over lay faculty members at church-related schools, given serious First 
Amendment questions potentially raised).  
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of the speech engaged in by the university or those affili-
ated with it.”63  No such effort is involved here.  Neither 
the Brown University majority, nor the parties or amici in 
this case, have explained how the “right to speak freely 
in the classroom” (in the Brown University Board’s 
phrase) would be infringed by collective bargaining over 
“terms and conditions of employment” for employed 
graduate students, as the Act envisions.64  
Further, the Supreme Court has explained that 
“[a]lthough parties are free to bargain about any legal 
subject, Congress has limited the mandate or duty to bar-
gain to matters of ‘wages, hours, and other terms and 
conditions of employment.’”65  Defining the precise con-
tours of what is a mandatory subject of bargaining for 
student assistants is a task that the Board can and should 
address case by case.66  That approach will permit the 
Board to consider any genuine First Amendment issues 
that might actually arise—in a concrete, not speculative, 
context.67
In upholding that Board’s authority to exercise juris-
diction over faculty members at private universities—
provided that they are statutory employees—the Supreme 
Court has implicitly rejected the view that some unde-
fined need to preserve academic freedom overrides that 
policies of the Act.  In Yeshiva University, supra, the 
Court found that the full-time university faculty members
there—whose “authority in academic matters [was] abso-
                                               
63 University of Pennsylvania v. EEOC, 493 U.S. 182, 197 (1990)
(emphasis in original) (rejecting university’s First Amendment chal-
lenge to EEOC investigative subpoena under Title VII, seeking materi-
als related to faculty-member tenure review process alleged to be dis-
criminatory).
64 National Labor Relations Act, §8(d), 29 U.S.C. §158(d) (“[T]o 
bargain collectively is the performance of the mutual obligation of the 
employer and the representative of the employees to meet at reasonable 
times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other
terms and conditions of employment . . . but such obligation does not 
compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a 
concession.”).
65 First National Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666, 674–
675 (1981) (footnotes omitted).
66 In this situation, as with other aspects of labor law, the “‘nature of 
the problem, as revealed by unfolding variant situations,’ requires ‘an 
evolutionary process for its rational response, not a quick, definitive 
formula as a comprehensive answer.”’’ Eastex, Inc. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 
556, 575 (1978), quoting Electrical Workers v. NLRB, 366 U.S. 667, 
674 (1961).
67 In Associated Press v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 103, 132-133 (1937), 
which involved the discriminatory discharge of an editorial employee, 
the Supreme Court upheld Board jurisdiction over a news-gathering 
organization, despite arguments that it would violate the First Amend-
ment freedom of the press.  The Court found that Board’s reinstatement 
order “in nowise circumscribe[d]” the First Amendment rights of the 
Associated Press, observed that the “publisher of a newspaper has no 
special immunity from the application of general laws,” and rejected
the contention that because “regulation in a situation not presented 
would be invalid,” the Board could not exercise jurisdiction at all.
lute”68—were excluded from the Act’s coverage, as 
managerial employees, on that basis.  But the Court also 
observed that not all university faculty members will be 
managerial employees and that “professors may not be 
excluded [from statutory coverage] merely because they 
determine the content of their own courses, evaluate their 
own students, and supervise their own research.”69  If the 
Brown University Board’s broad view of academic free-
dom were correct, then it seems highly unlikely that the 
Yeshiva Court could have contemplated collective bar-
gaining by university professors (as, indeed, the Board 
has permitted for many years70) in the face of such an 
obvious constitutional obstacle.  
3. Empirical Evidence and the Board’s Experience Indi-
cate That It Is Appropriate for the Board to Exercise Ju-
risdiction over Student Assistants
If, historically, the Board had permitted student assis-
tants to engage in collective bargaining, and if actual 
experience over the years had demonstrated both that 
collective bargaining rarely proved beneficial to students 
and that it seriously harmed the ability of private univer-
sities to function effectively, then perhaps the Board 
would have had grounds for deciding that the Act cannot 
productively be applied in the university setting.  But that 
is not the case, because collective bargaining by student 
assistants at private universities is historically uncom-
mon.  Neither administrative experience nor empirical 
evidence supported the Brown University Board’s deter-
mination that extending statutory protection to student 
assistants would be detrimental to the educational pro-
cess.  
It is telling, moreover, that the Brown University
Board gave no weight at all to the analogous experience 
of public universities with collective bargaining by stu-
dent assistants or to private universities’ experience with 
faculty bargaining, subjects we turn to below.  The expe-
rience of student assistant collective bargaining at public 
universities provides no support for the fearful predic-
tions of the Brown University Board.  In the words of one 
scholar, “[t]here appear to be no major disasters that have 
arisen because of [graduate-student] unions,” and exam-
ples of collective bargaining in practice “appear to 
demonstrate that economic and academic issues on cam-
pus can indeed be separated.”71
                                               
68 444 U.S. at 686.
69 Id. at 690, fn. 31.
70 See, e.g., Bradford College, 261 NLRB 565 (1982).  See also Pa-
cific Lutheran University, 361 NLRB No. 157 (2014).
71 Judith Wagner DeCew, Unionization in the Academy: Visions and 
Realities 98 (2003). See also Josh Rinschler, Students or Employees?  
The Struggle over Graduate Student Unions in America’s Private Col-
leges and Universities, 36 J. College & University L. 615, 639–640 
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Here, Columbia, its supporting amici, and our dissent-
ing colleague defend the Brown University decision, 
echoing the claim that permitting collective bargaining 
by student assistants will harm the educational process.  
These arguments are dubious on their own terms.  Our 
skepticism is based on the historic flexibility of collec-
tive bargaining as a practice and its viability at public 
universities where graduate student assistants are repre-
sented by labor unions and among faculty members at 
private universities. 
As the Brown University dissenters observed, 
“[c]ollective bargaining by graduate student employees is 
increasingly a fact of American university life.”72  Recent 
data show that more than 64,000 graduate student em-
ployees are organized at 28 institutions of higher educa-
tion, a development that began at the University of Wis-
consin at Madison in 1969 and that now encompasses 
universities in California, Florida, Illinois, Iowa, Massa-
chusetts, Michigan, Oregon, Pennsylvania, and Washing-
ton.73  At these universities, to be sure, collective bar-
gaining is governed by state law, not by the National 
Labor Relations Act.74  Even so, the experience with 
graduate-student collective bargaining in public universi-
ties is of relevance in applying the Act, as the closest 
proxy for experience under the Act.75  
By way of example, as AFT notes in its amicus brief, 
the University of Illinois, Michigan State University, and 
Wayne State University include language in their gradu-
ate-assistant collective-bargaining agreements giving 
                                                                          
(2010) (“[E]vidence from public institutions as well as from NYU 
during the period it had a graduate student union, suggests that unioni-
zation does not result in the sky falling.”).
72 342 NLRB at 493 (dissent of Members Liebman and Walsh).  The 
dissenters cited a body of scholarly literature examining this develop-
ment. Id. at fn. 1.  See Neal H. Hutchens & Melisa B. Hutchens, 
Catching the Union Bug: Graduate Student Employees and Unioniza-
tion, 39 Gonzaga L. Rev. 105, 106–107 (2004); Daniel J. Julius & 
Patricia J. Gumport, Graduate Student Unionization: Catalysts and 
Consequences, 26 Review of Higher Education 187, 191–196 (2002); 
Grant M. Hayden, “The University Works Because We Do”: Collective 
Bargaining Rights for Graduate Assistants, 69 Fordham L. Rev. 1233, 
1236–1243 (2001).  See also DeCew, supra, Unionization in the Acad-
emy at 89-110.
73 J. Berry & M. Savarese, Directory of U.S. Faculty Contracts and 
Bargaining Agents in Institutions of Higher Education (2012).  See also 
Daniel J. Julius & Nicholas DiGiovanni, Jr., Academic Collective Bar-
gaining: On Campus Fifty Years, Center for Studies in Higher Educa-
tion, Research & Occasional Paper Series: CSHE 4.13 at 5 (April 
2013), available at www.cshe.berkeley.edu/publications.
74 Sec. 2(2) of the Act excludes “any State or political subdivision 
thereof” from the definition of “employer.”  29 U.S.C. §152(2).
75 Cf. Management Training Corp., 317 NLRB 1355, 1357 (1995) 
(holding that Board will exercise jurisdiction over employers without 
considering extent of their control over purely economic terms and 
conditions of employment and citing “successful and effective bargain-
ing” in public sector “where economic benefits play a small role”).
management defined rights concerning courses, course 
content, course assignments, exams, class size, grading 
policies and methods of instruction, as well as graduate 
students’ progress on their own degrees.76  This is not to 
suggest a prescription for how individual collective-
bargaining agreements should resolve matters related to 
the protection of academic freedom and educational pre-
rogatives.  Rather, these agreements show that parties 
can and successfully have navigated delicate topics near 
the intersection of the university’s dual role as educator 
and employer.
Other scholars, whose studies were cited in the Brown 
University dissent,77 confirm that view.  Based on their 
survey-based research of public universities, they reject 
the claim, for example, that collective bargaining will 
harm mentoring relationships between faculty members 
and graduate students.78  More recent survey-based re-
search found “no support” for the contentions that gradu-
ate student unionization “would harm the faculty-student 
relationship” or “would diminish academic freedom,” 
and observed that “[d]espite the NLRB’s focus on the 
potential negative effects on academic outcomes, gradu-
ate students themselves have likely been more concerned 
with the basic terms and conditions of employment.”79  
Although Columbia presented the testimony of an aca-
demic economist to address this study, its expert simply 
maintained that the study could not “rule out harm or 
benefit” to the faculty-student relationship from collec-
tive bargaining.  When the best analytical evidence of-
fered by Columbia suggests merely that neither harm nor 
benefit from collective bargaining can be ruled out, the 
dire predictions of the Brown University Board are un-
dercut.  
                                               
76 Agreement by and between the Board of Trustees of the Universi-
ty of Illinois and Graduate Employees’ Organization IFT/AFT 6300 
(August 16, 2012—August 15, 2017), available at 
http://www.ahr.illinois.edu/geo.pdf; Collective Bargaining Agreement 
between Michigan State University and The Graduate Employees Un-
ion, Local 6196, AFT-Michigan/AFL–CIO (May 2015—May 2019), 
available at https://www.hr.msu.edu/documents/contracts/GEU2015-
2019.pdf; Collective Bargaining Agreement between Wayne State 
University and The Graduate Employees Organizing
Committee, AFT (May 2015—February 2018), available at 
http://provost.wayne.edu/pdf/geoc_contract_2015–2018_w_toc.pdf.
77 342 NLRB at 499-500.
78 Julius & Gumport, supra, Graduate Student Unionization: Cata-
lysts and Consequences, 26 Review of Higher Education at 201, 209; 
Gordon J. Hewitt, Graduate Student Employee Collective Bargaining 
and the Educational Relationship between Faculty and Graduate Stu-
dents, 29 J. Collective Negotiations in the Public Sector 153, 159–164 
(2000).
79 Sean E. Rogers, Adrienne E. Eaton, and Paula B. Voos, Effects of 
Unionization on Graduate Student Employees: Faculty-Student Rela-
tions, Academic Freedom, and Pay, 66 Industrial & Labor Relations 
Rev. 487, 507 (2013).    
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Columbia and supporting amici point to a few individ-
ual examples arising from the 28 public universities and 
64,000 represented public university student assistants, 
along with NYU on the private side, in which, they con-
tend, collective bargaining by student assistants has 
proven detrimental to the pursuit of the school’s educa-
tional goals.  They note the occurrences of strikes and 
grievances over teaching workload and tuition waivers.  
Similarly, they point to grievances over classroom as-
signments and eligibility criteria for assistantships.  But 
labor disputes are a fact of economic life—and the Act is 
intended to address them.   
Columbia and its supporting amici suggest that collec-
tive-bargaining demands would interfere with academic 
decisions involving class size, time, length, and location, 
as well as decisions concerning the formatting of exams.  
They also worry that disputes over whether bargaining is 
required for such issues may lead to protracted litigation 
over the parties’ rights and obligations as to a given is-
sue, for example, over the propriety of a university’s 
change in class or exam format, thus burdening the time-
sensitive educational process.  However, to a large ex-
tent, the Board’s demarcation of what is a mandatory 
subject of bargaining for student assistants, and what is 
not, would ultimately resolve these potential problems.80  
Moreover, there is no good reason to doubt that unions 
and universities will be able to negotiate contract lan-
guage to delineate mutually satisfactory boundaries of 
their respective rights and obligations.81  Indeed, faculty 
members have successfully negotiated collective-
bargaining agreements that address terms and conditions 
of employment at private universities while contractually 
ensuring academic freedom for decades.82
                                               
80 Indeed, decisions concerning management’s right to control its 
fundamental operations and to produce a product of its choosing are 
issues of concern to manufacturing employers as well.  Collective bar-
gaining does not limit such a management right normally, unless the 
parties consent to it.  See First National Maintenance v. NLRB, 452
U.S. 666, 677–679 (1981).  However, in a common feature of collective 
bargaining across economic sectors, employers must, and do, routinely 
address incidental operational impacts based on their agreements with 
unions.  For example, an employer chooses the amount and type of 
product it produces, but an employer must bargain about employees’ 
hours of work and must operate within whatever work-hours constraint 
it agrees to. 
81 Notably, the NYU graduate assistants union, voluntarily recog-
nized by that university after the Board overruled its NYU decision, has 
given the university control over academic matters in the parties’ col-
lective-bargaining agreement.
82 As AAUP notes in its amicus brief, many of its unionized faculty 
chapters’ collective-bargaining agreements expressly refer to and quote 
the AAUP’s 1940 Statement of Principles on Academic Freedom and 
Tenure, which provides a framework that has proven mutually agreea-
ble to many unions and universities.  See 1940 Statement of Principles 
The notion that the parties themselves can resolve, 
through the bargaining process, many of the latent con-
flicts suggested by Columbia and amici (as well as by 
our dissenting colleague)—and hence forge successful 
bargaining relationships—is not a theoretical one.  The 
experience at New York University is a case in point.  
Even after Brown University issued, NYU continued—
after a brief interruption—to voluntarily recognize its 
graduate assistants union and successfully negotiated 
collective-bargaining agreements with that union. 
Both the original and successor agreements at NYU 
addressed such matters as stipends, pay periods, disci-
pline and discharge, job posting, a grievance-and-
arbitration procedure, and health insurance—nearly all 
familiar mandatory subjects of bargaining across the pri-
vate sector, which appear to have been successfully 
adapted to a university setting.83  The agreements also 
incorporate a “management and academic rights” clause, 
which would tend to allay fears that collective bargaining 
will attempt to dictate academic matters. 84  In the most 
recent agreement, in effect from September 1, 2014, to 
August 31, 2020, the clause preserved the university’s 
right to “determine . . . qualifications . . . and assignment 
of graduate employees; to determine the processes and 
criteria by which graduate employees’ performance is 
evaluated; . . . to schedule hours of work; . . . to deter-
mine how and when and by whom instruction is deliv-
ered; . . . to introduce new methods of instruction; . . .
and to exercise sole authority on all decisions involving 
                                                                          
on Academic Freedom and Tenure, available at 
https://www.aaup.org/file/1940%20Statement.pdf.
83 The evidence all seems to suggest that the bread-and-butter eco-
nomic concerns reflected in the NYU collective-bargaining agreement 
are what drive American graduate students to seek union representa-
tion.  See, e.g., Julius & Gumport, supra, Graduate Student Unioniza-
tion: Catalysts and Consequences, 26 Review of Higher Education at 
196 (“[D]ata show that the unionization of these individuals is driven 
fundamentally by economic realities.”); Gerrilynn Falasco & William J. 
Jackson, The Graduate Assistant Labor Movement, NYU and Its After-
math: A Study of the Attitudes of Graduate Teaching and Research 
Assistants at Seven Universities, 21 Hofstra Labor & Employment L. J. 
753,  800 (2004) (“Overwhelmingly, the respondents from the seven 
universities surveyed indicated that the most important issues to them 
were wages and health insurance”). 
84 Collective-Bargaining Agreements between NYU and Internation-
al Union, UAW, AFL-CIO and Local 2110, Technical Office and Pro-
fessional Workers, UAW, Sept. 1, 2001-Aug. 31, 2005, and Sept. 1, 
2014-Aug. 31, 2020, Art. XXII.  See Brown University, supra, 342 
NLRB at 499 (dissent) (discussing agreement).  The cited clause would 
seem to confirm the view of one scholar that the “historical develop-
ment of professional norms of academic freedom creates a strong po-
tential for faculty and GAs [employed graduate students] to find com-
mon interests in carrying out the core functions of the university.”  Risa 
L. Lieberwitz, Faculty in the Corporate University: Professional Iden-
tity, Law and Collective Action, 16 Cornell J. L. & Public Policy 263, 
326 (2007) (discussing events at Cornell).
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academic matters . . . decisions regarding who is taught, 
what is taught, how it is taught and who does the teach-
ing.” 85  
Moreover, to the extent disputes nonetheless do arise, 
the process of resolving such disputes over the bounda-
ries of parties’ rights and obligations is common to near-
ly all collective-bargaining contexts in which manage-
ment seeks to act in some way it believes is important to 
its business, including critical sectors such as national 
security and national defense.  Not long after Brown 
University was decided, for example, the Board observed 
that “for over 60 years, in times of both war and peace, 
the Board has asserted jurisdiction over employers and 
employees that have been involved in national security 
and defense,” and that the Board could “find no case in 
which our protection of employees’ Section 7 rights had 
an adverse impact on national security or defense.”86  
Similarly, in the acute care hospital sector, the Boston 
Medical Center Board, supra, recognized house staff at 
teaching hospitals as statutory employees, and the 
Board’s experience since that decision has provided no 
support for one dissenting member’s prediction that 
“American graduate medical education [would] be irrep-
arably harmed”87 if the Board asserted jurisdiction over 
house staff. 
These critical sectors have proven able to effectively 
integrate collective bargaining, with its occasional dis-
putes and attendant delays, into their modes of doing 
business.  We have no reason to doubt that the higher-
education sector cannot do the same.  Indeed, some of 
the practical concerns raised by Columbia and amici 
seem to be generic complaints about the statutory re-
quirements inherent in a collective-bargaining relation-
ship, rather than education-specific concerns.  For exam-
ple, it is posed as problematic by amici that a university 
may have to bargain, at least as to effect, over the elimi-
                                               
85 We recognize that part of the ostensible reason NYU decided to 
withdraw recognition from its union of student assistants was the rec-
ommendations of two university committees, which cited the union’s 
filing of grievances that were perceived as threatening to undercut 
NYU’s academic decisionmaking.  We need not decide whether this 
perception was accurate or whether it would hold true over time and at 
other universities where student assistants organized.  That employees 
may invoke their Sec. 7 rights to a greater or lesser degree has no bear-
ing on whether the Act should be interpreted to grant them those rights.  
We note, in any case, that the NYU collective-bargaining relationship 
was new, that the collective-bargaining agreement was untested, and 
that ultimately the university appears to have prevailed in grievance-
arbitration proceedings in its assertion of its academic prerogatives.    
86 Firstline Transportation Security, 347 NLRB 447, 453 (2006) (re-
jecting argument that Board should decline to assert jurisdiction over 
privately-employed airport security screeners, on national-security 
grounds).
87 Boston Medical Center, supra, 330 NLRB at 182.
nation of assistantship positions.  However, bargaining 
over staffing levels is a core concern of employees, and 
standard fare for collective bargaining.  Fulfilling one’s 
obligation to bargain about job loss or staffing levels, or 
the effects thereof, has not proven unduly burdensome to 
countless other unionized workplaces.88  Similarly, Co-
lumbia and amici, as well as our dissenting colleague, 
also raise the specter of strikes (and lockouts), and the 
impact they might have on the educational trajectory of 
students and on their considerable investment in their 
education; but the problems raised by strikes are com-
mon to nearly all industries in which the Board accords 
employees bargaining rights.89  
Moreover, we cannot give credence to the dissent’s 
speculation that, among other things, the provisions of 
the Act might negatively interfere with university confi-
dentiality practices or standards of decorum, for example 
by authorizing abusive language by student assistants 
directed against faculty.  The Act’s provisions pertaining 
to document production and the boundaries of protected 
conduct are, and always have been, contextual.  The 
Board evaluates such claims in light of workplace stand-
ards and other relevant rules and practices.
Moreover, while focusing on a few discrete problems 
that may arise in bargaining—without considering the 
likelihood that they would both actually occur and not be 
amenable to resolution by bargaining partners acting in 
good faith—Columbia and amici neglect to weigh the 
                                               
88 See, e.g., St. Anthony Hospital Systems, 319 NLRB 46, 47 & 50 
(1995) (discussing a hospital’s duty to bargain with nurses’ union over 
staffing levels).
89Strikes may affect the operations of an employer—especially in in-
dustries where the provision of goods and services may be time-
sensitive.  However, these already include many sectors where collec-
tive bargaining has long been a staple of workplace life, such as those 
involving caring for hospital patients, maintaining critical infrastruc-
ture, publishing newspapers, unloading billions of dollars in overseas 
freight, and teaching students in college or pre-college settings (as in 
the case of unionized faculty in private schools).  In all of these situa-
tions, strikes pose the possibility of a disruption with significant costs, 
given the value and/or time-sensitivity of the goods and services in-
volved.  Yet, the Act permits collective bargaining in these sectors; and 
indeed, employers have incorporated the risks of economic conflict into 
their negotiation strategies and modes of doing business.  The Board’s 
experience demonstrates that parties grasp the seriousness of recourse 
to economic weapons, and do not do so lightly or without the convic-
tion that their position is worth fighting for.  There is no reason to set 
universities apart, where the Act otherwise points toward coverage.
Our dissenting colleague points to the potential for unique conse-
quences to student assistants in the event of a work stoppage, such as 
loss of academic credit and tuition waivers.  As we have noted, the Act 
permits collective bargaining—and permits parties to decide for them-
selves what risks to take—even where there is a potential for economic 
disruption.  However, to the extent a work stoppage cannot be avoided, 
parties will frequently resolve a strike or lockout on terms that address 
questions pertaining to vested rights and other such matters that arose 
because of the work stoppage.  
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possibility of any benefits that flow from collective bar-
gaining, such as those envisioned by Congress when it 
adopted the Act.  In this connection, it is worth noting 
that student assistants, in the absence of access to the 
Act’s representation procedures and in the face of rising 
financial pressures, have been said to be “fervently lob-
bying their respective schools for better benefits and in-
creased representation.”90  The eagerness of at least some 
student assistants to engage in bargaining suggests that 
the traditional model of relations between university and 
student assistants is insufficiently responsive to student 
assistants’ needs.  That is not to say collective bargaining 
will necessarily be a panacea for such discontent, but it 
further favors coverage by the Act, which was designed 
to ameliorate labor unrest.91  
Finally, we disagree with the suggestion of our dissent-
ing colleague that the Act’s procedures are ill suited here, 
because student assistants have finite terms and because 
the academic world may experience a fast pace of devel-
opment in fields of study, and thus because, in the time it 
takes for the Board to resolve a question arising under 
                                               
90 David Ludwig, Why Graduate Students of America Are Uniting, 
The Atlantic, available at 
http://www.theatlantic.com/education/archive/2015/04/graduate-
students-of-the-world-unite/390261/.  See also Rachel Bernstein, Ivy 
League Graduate Students Push for Unionization, Science, available at 
http://www.sciencemag.org/careers/2015/04/ivy-league-graduate-
students-push-unionization (“Graduate students’ concerns include 
inadequate health insurance, high prices for dependent coverage on 
student health insurance policies, and insufficient child care and family 
leave support.”).  Indeed, some scholarship suggests that universities 
are actively seeking to derive greater profit from instructional and 
research activities, and to lower their teaching costs.  Such endeavors—
to lower labor costs to increase profit—are hallmarks of the sort of 
economic dynamic in which, historically, employees’ bargaining rights 
have played an important countervailing role.  See generally The Cor-
poratization of Higher Education, 39 Monitor on Psychology 50 
(2008), available at http://www.apa.org/monitor/2008/12/higher-
ed.aspx.
91 Indeed, it is important to note the policy judgment embodied in the 
Act: that collective bargaining can help avert workplace unrest that 
may occur in the absence of a process for employees to choose repre-
sentation, bargain collectively, and resolve disputes peacefully.  See 
NLRB v. Insurance Agents’ International Union, 361 U.S. 477, 488 
(1960) (good-faith bargaining “may narrow the issues, making the real 
demands of the parties clearer to each other, and perhaps to themselves, 
and may encourage an attitude of settlement through give and take.”). 
The Act is designed to lessen conflict by channeling disputes into struc-
tured negotiations and reflects the judgment of Congress that collective 
bargaining, with its occasional attendant workplace conflicts such as 
strikes and lockouts, is a right to be accorded broadly and across many 
industries.  
It is noteworthy that at NYU, graduate assistants struck after the 
Board reversed its NYU decision and the school withdrew recognition 
from their union. Without the protection of the Act, student assistants 
lacked recourse to the orderly channels of bargaining and instead chose 
to resort to more a disruptive means of resolving their dispute with the 
University.
the Act, there may be significant turnover or other 
changes involving affected employees.  It goes without 
saying that the resolution of cases under the Act, both 
representation and unfair labor practice cases, before the 
Board and the courts can be time-consuming.  However, 
this is simply not a basis on which to deny the Act’s pro-
tections to student assistants.  The alternative—to deny 
coverage because of the effects of procedural delays—
would seem to countenance the denial of the Act’s cov-
erage to large groups of employees whose tenures are 
short or industries where there is a rapid pace of 
change.92  
In sum, there is no compelling reason—in theory or in 
practice—to conclude that collective bargaining by stu-
dent assistants cannot be viable or that it would seriously 
interfere with higher education.  We have put supposi-
tions aside today and have instead carefully considered 
the text of the Act as interpreted by the Supreme Court, 
the Act’s clearly stated policies, the experience of the 
Board, and the relevant empirical evidence drawn from 
collective bargaining in the university setting.  This is not 
a case, of course, where the Board must accommodate 
the National Labor Relations Act with some other federal 
statute related to private universities that might weigh 
against permitting student assistants to seek union repre-
sentation and engage in collective bargaining.  Finding 
student assistants to be statutory employees, and permit-
                                               
92 In cases involving seasonal workplaces or those with significant 
turnover, the Board has held elections even though, when there have 
been employer challenges, bargaining may not begin until well after the 
election.  In this connection, the Board generally presumes that new 
employees support the union in the same proportion as those who vot-
ed.  See generally NLRB v. Curtin Matheson Scientific, Inc., 494 U.S. 
775, 779 (1990).  Otherwise, it would be difficult for employees in any 
workplace with high turnover to ever achieve representation, because 
the nature of administrative adjudication, as well as the provision of 
due process to an employer’s challenges to certification may delay a 
final ruling on certification.  Conversely, when an employer's operation 
is seasonal in nature or otherwise involves peaks and valleys in em-
ployment, the Board retains the discretion to adjust the election date to 
ensure that a representative group of employees will be able to express 
their choice concerning representation.  See, e.g., Tusculum College, 
199 NLRB 28, 33 (1972) (adjusting date of election to the beginning of 
the fall semester to ensure that a representative complement of the 
petitioned-for faculty would have an opportunity to express their wish-
es). 
In unfair labor practice cases, remedies are commonly applied after 
affected individuals have ceased working for an employer.  But reme-
dies are tailored to address the violation of the Act relative to the con-
text in which they are applied.  Backpay or other monetary remedies 
may still be appropriate even after an individual is no longer in an 
employment relationship with a respondent.  Other remedies, such as in 
a bad-faith bargaining case, involve the unit as a whole, and thus may 
be implemented in the future, notwithstanding the turnover of individu-
al employees.  Notice-posting requirements ensure that future comple-
ments of employees are aware of any violations and provide assurances 
that the violations will not continue in the future.
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ting them to seek union representation, does not conflict 
with any federal statute related to private universities, as 
far as we can discern.  Certainly the Brown University
Board cited no statutory conflict, nor have the parties and 
amici in this case.93  Our conclusion is that affording 
student assistants the right to engage in collective bar-
gaining will further the policies of the Act, without en-
gendering any cognizable, countervailing harm to private 
higher education.  
Accordingly, we overrule Brown University and hold 
that student assistants who have a common-law employ-
ment relationship with their university are statutory em-
ployees entitled to the protections of the Act.  
                                               
93 Where a party does not actually raise a supposed conflict between 
the Act and another federal statute, the Board is not required to consid-
er the issue.  Can-Am Plumbing, Inc., 350 NLRB 947, 947–948 (2007).  
For his part, our dissenting colleague takes us to task for failing to 
accommodate the Act with the “broad range of federal statutes and 
regulations [that] apply to colleges and universities,” which “govern, 
among other things, the accreditation of colleges and universities, the 
enhancement of quality, the treatment of student assistance, gradu-
ate/postsecondary improvement programs, and the privacy of student 
records.”  But our colleague does not explain how any one of these 
education statutes and regulations bears on the specific issue posed in 
this case or how the Board should accommodate the Act to them—short 
of not applying our statute at all to student assistants.  That alternative, 
of course, is disfavored, unless a conflict between two federal statutes 
is truly irreconcilable.  See Lewis v. Epic Systems Corp., 823 F.3d 
1147, 1157 (7th Cir. 2016) (rejecting asserted conflict between NLRA 
and Federal Arbitration Act).  There is no such conflict here, as we 
have already explained.  See fn. 50, supra.
That an industry or economic sector is governed in certain respects 
by other federal laws, in addition to being covered by the NLRA, can-
not mean that the Board must determine, in the abstract, whether the 
general policies of those other laws might be better accomplished if the 
Act did not apply, notwithstanding the absence of any exemption from 
coverage in the statutory text or the legislative history.  It is far too late 
in the day—45 years after the Board’s decision in Cornell University, 
supra—to argue that the Act cannot safely be applied to private univer-
sities.  The supposed conflicts our colleague conjures would seem to 
arise, for example, in cases where the Board applies the Act to universi-
ty faculty members, but there is no suggestion in our case law that an 
actual conflict has ever arisen (or even been raised by a university 
employer).
Our colleague identifies one specific, potential conflict between the 
NLRA and federal education law related to the disclosure of education-
al records, where Sec. 8(a)(5) of the Act, which grants unions the right 
to information necessary for carrying out their collective-bargaining 
duties, conceivably could require a disclosure that the Family Educa-
tional Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA) might otherwise prohibit. Any 
such conflict can and should be addressed in the particular factual set-
ting in which it arises.  Suffice it to say that the Act recognizes that a 
union’s right to information may, in a particular context, be subordinat-
ed to a legitimate confidentiality interest.  See, e.g., Olean General 
Hospital, 363 NLRB No. 62, slip op. at 7–8 (2015) (considering state 
laws protecting patient confidentiality). See generally Detroit Edison 
Co. v. NLRB, 440 U.S. 301 (1979).
III. APPLICATION TO THIS CASE
We now apply our holding to the facts of this case.  
For the reasons that follow, we conclude (1) that all of 
the petitioned-for student-assistant classifications consist 
of statutory employees; (2) that the petitioned-for bar-
gaining unit (comprising graduate students, terminal 
Master’s degree students, and undergraduate students) is
an appropriate unit; and (3) that none of the petitioned-
for classifications consists of temporary employees who 
must be excluded from the unit by virtue of the limited 
length of their employment.   
A. Statement of Facts
Columbia is a nonprofit postsecondary educational in-
stitution located in New York City.  Columbia’s major 
sources of annual revenue include tuition (net revenue of 
$940 million in 2015, nearly a quarter of operating reve-
nue) and government contracts and grants ($750 mil-
lion).94  
Graduate students at Columbia are selected by the fac-
ulty of the academic departments into which they are 
accepted on the basis of academic performance, as 
demonstrated by educational background and standard-
ized test scores.  In general, Ph.D. candidates spend five
to nine years of study within their discipline, during 
which they take coursework, as well as prepare a doctor-
al thesis, that the candidates develop with guidance of 
faculty or in connection with their laboratory work.  Dur-
ing their enrollment, candidates are subject to various 
academic requirements, including timely progress toward 
a thesis and proficiency in coursework.  Most Ph.D. can-
didates are required to take on teaching duties for at least 
one semester as part of their academic requirements, alt-
hough many departments require additional semesters of 
teaching as a condition for obtaining a degree.95
Columbia fully funds most Ph.D. student assistants, 
typically providing tuition and a stipend, for at least their 
                                               
94 See Consolidated Financial Statements, The Trustees of Columbia 
University in the City of New York, available at 
http://finance.columbia.edu/files/gateway/content/reports/financials201
5.pdf.  Tuition and government grants are the second and third largest 
revenue streams.  Columbia, which operates a hospital, earned the most 
revenue, approximately $1 billion, from patient care. 
A substantial portion of the tuition revenue comes from students in 
graduate and professional programs, including law and business.  How-
ever, the approximately 8500 undergraduates at Columbia, paying 
approximately $25,000 in base tuition per semester, generate about 
$376 million in tuition revenue, of which only $148 million is offset by 
grant aid from Columbia.  See Columbia University, Institutional Grant 
Aid by School, 2014–2015, available at 
http://www.columbia.edu/cu/opir/abstract/opir_institutional_grant_aid_
1.htm.
95 There is some variation as to the specifics of degree program re-
quirements and the nature of student assistant duties across schools and 
programs at Columbia.
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first 5 years of study.  In most students’ second through 
fourth year, taking on teaching or research duties is a 
condition for full receipt of such funding.  For most 
Ph.D. candidates, the first and fifth years are funded 
without a condition of service.  In students’ sixth year 
and beyond, teaching-based support may be available.  
Research-based financial support, unlike teaching sup-
port, frequently comes in whole or in part from sources 
outside the University.  Grants from government or other 
outside entities, generally to support a specified research 
task, often cover research assistants’ financial awards.  
However, the University will make up any shortfall if 
outside grants provide a level of funding that falls below 
the standard graduate funding package.  
Terminal Master’s degree students (as opposed to 
those who earn the degree as an intermediate step toward 
earning a Ph.D.) typically earn their degrees in shorter 
time periods and do not prepare a thesis.  They receive 
very little financial aid, although some take on teaching 
duties for which they receive compensation.
The nature of teaching duties for a teaching assis-
tantship varies.  Columbia’s teaching assistants, known 
as Instructional Officers, fall into various subsidiary cat-
egories, which involve varying levels of discretion and 
involvement in course design.  Undergraduate, Master’s 
degree, and Ph.D. student assistants can all serve in 
teaching assistant roles, with some similarities in their 
duties, although Ph.D. teaching assistants may take on 
the most advanced duties.  Notably, some Instructional 
Officers teach components of the core curriculum, which 
is Columbia’s signature course requirement for all un-
dergraduate students regardless of major.  Instructional 
Officers generally work up to 20 hours per week, and 
they are typically appointed for one or two semesters at a 
time.
Instructional Officers include the specific classifica-
tions of Teaching Fellows and Teaching Assistants.  
Teaching Fellows are doctoral students in the Graduate 
School of Arts and Sciences, while Teaching Assistants
may be either doctoral or Master’s degree students and 
perform similar functions outside the Graduate School of 
Arts and Sciences.  Teaching Fellows and Teaching As-
sistants spend 15–20 hours a week undertaking a wide 
range of duties with respect to a course.  Their duties 
may include grading papers and holding office hours, 
leading discussion or laboratory sessions, or assuming 
most or all the teaching responsibilities for a given 
course.  Columbia maintains other, specialized teaching-
assistant funding as well.  Instructional officers who par-
ticipate in the Teaching Scholars Program, a category 
that includes Ph.D. students who are somewhat advanced 
in their studies, teach courses that they have designed for 
undergraduates in their junior or senior years.  Under-
graduates serve in the Teaching Assistant III classifica-
tion.  They are responsible for grading homework and 
running laboratory or problem sections that are ancillary 
to large classes within the School of General Studies and 
Columbia College.
The category of Instructional Officers also includes 
classifications of Preceptors and Readers (sometimes 
referred to as “Graders”).  Preceptors are graduate assis-
tants who teach significant undergraduate courses with 
high levels of independence.  These positions are gener-
ally available only to graduate students far along in their 
studies because they require the highest level of teaching 
ability.  Preceptors hold office hours, design and grade 
all exams and assignments in their courses, and assign 
final grades to their students.  Readers/Graders are Mas-
ter’s degree students who are appointed to grade papers 
under the direction of a course instructor.  Finally, 
Course Assistants, who are not Instructional Officers and 
do not receive semester-long appointments, assist faculty 
with administering classes by performing clerical tasks 
that may include proctoring exams, printing and collect-
ing homework, answering students’ questions, and occa-
sionally grading assignments. 
Research Officers generally participate in research
funded by outside entities.  The research grants specify 
the nature of the research and the duties of the individu-
als working on the grant.  The revenue from the grant 
beyond the amounts allotted to research assistantships 
goes to Columbia’s general operating expenses.  Gradu-
ate Research Assistants in Ph.D. programs must both 
comply with the duties specified by the grant and simul-
taneously carry out research that they will ultimately 
present as part of their thesis.96  Departmental Research 
Assistants, by contrast, are Master’s degree students and 
are appointed and funded by the University and provide 
research assistance to a particular department or school 
within the University.
Teaching and research occur with the guidance of a 
faculty member or under the direction of an academic 
department.  In the teaching context, poor performance 
by an instructional officer is addressed through remedial 
training, although in one instance poor performance re-
sulted in the University’s removal of a student’s teaching 
duties, and the cancellation of his stipend.
B. Application of the Revised Section 2(3) Analysis
For the reasons that follow, we conclude that the peti-
tioned-for student-assistant classifications in this case97
                                               
96 Training grant recipients are subject to slightly different condi-
tions, and are discussed below.  
97 As reflected in its petition, the Union here seeks to represent:
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comprise statutory employees:  individuals with a com-
mon-law employment relationship with Columbia Uni-
versity.  At the hearing before the Regional Director, 
Columbia seemingly conceded98 that, if the Board were 
to adopt the common-law test, the petitioned-for individ-
uals—with the exception of students operating under 
training grants—were employees under the Act.  In its 
brief to the Board on review, however, Columbia argues 
that research assistants are not common-law employees, 
citing the Board’s decision in Leland Stanford, supra.  
With respect to teaching assistants, Columbia confines 
itself to arguing that the common-law test should not be 
the standard of statutory employment (a position we have 
rejected).  Below, we begin by examining the common-
law employment status of Columbia’s student assistants 
generally.  We then address arguments specific to the 
status of Columbia’s research assistants and overrule 
Leland Stanford because its reasoning cannot be recon-
ciled with the general approach we adopt today.    
1. Instructional Officers99
Common-law employment, as noted above, generally 
requires that the employer have the right to control the 
employee’s work, and that the work be performed in ex-
change for compensation.100  That is the case here.  
                                                                          
All student employees who provide instructional services, including 
graduate and undergraduate Teaching Assistants (Teaching Assistants, 
Teaching Fellows, Preceptors, Course Assistants, Readers and Grad-
ers): All Graduate Research Assistants (including those compensated 
through Training Grants) and All Departmental Research Assistants 
employed by the Employer at all of its facilities, including Morning-
side Heights, Health Sciences, Lamont-Doherty and Nevis facilities.
98 At the hearing, Columbia’s counsel stated, “If the Board finds that 
students who provide services to their institutions are employees based 
on common law test of employment, if you will, then our position 
would be that the graduate research assistants and the teach-
ing assistants would be considered employees and part of an appropri-
ate bargaining unit, but that the students on training grants are simply 
not employees because they’re not employed in a University position, 
that they’re simply supported by the Government to be students and 
they don’t provide a service to the University.”
99 This category encompasses the Teaching Assistants, Teaching Fel-
lows, Preceptors, and Readers/Graders named in the petition.  Course 
assistants, a classification named in the petition, do not appear to be 
Instructional Officers and are not appointed on a semester-long basis.  
The increments of their employment—they may work in less-than-
semester-long intervals—may raise questions about their eligibility.  
However, we leave such determinations to the Regional Director in 
determining an eligibility formula (as we discuss, infra) in the first 
instance. 
100 See, e.g., Seattle Opera, supra, 292 F.3d at 762 (“[T]he person 
asserting statutory employee status [under the Act] does have such 
status if (1) he works for a statutory employer in return for financial or 
other compensation … and (2) the statutory employer has the power or 
right to control and direct the person in the material details of how such 
work is to be performed.”) (emphasis in original).  Accord Restatement 
of Employment Law §1.02 (2015) (“Where an educational institution 
Here, the University directs and oversees student assis-
tants’ teaching activities.  Indeed, the University pos-
sesses a significant interest in maintaining such control, 
as the student assistants’ work advances a key business 
operation of the University:  the education of undergrad-
uate students.  The record shows that teaching assistants 
who do not adequately perform their duties to the Uni-
versity’s satisfaction are subject to corrective counseling 
or removal.
Instructional officers receive compensation in ex-
change for providing services to the University.  Receipt 
of a full financial award is conditioned upon their per-
formance of teaching duties.  When they do not perform 
their assigned instructional duties, the record indicates 
they will not be paid.  For instance, after one assistant, 
Longxi Zhao, was removed from his teaching assis-
tantship, his stipend was cancelled.  In his termination 
letter, the University indicated that, “[T]his termination 
is effective immediately.  As a result, you will no longer 
receive a salary for this position.”  This letter, in connec-
tion with the explicit conditioning of awards on perfor-
mance of teaching duties, demonstrates that the Universi-
ty offers student assistants stipends as consideration for 
fulfilling their duties to perform instructional services on 
the University’s behalf.  
Although the payments to Ph.D. student assistants may 
be standardized to match fellowship or other non-work 
based aid, these payments are not merely financial aid.  
Students are required to work as a condition of receiving 
this tuition assistance during semesters when they take 
on instructional duties, and such duties confer a financial 
benefit on Columbia to offset its costs of financial aid, 
even if it chooses to distribute the benefit in such a way 
that equalizes financial aid for both assistants and non-
assistant students.  Indeed, in semesters where a student 
assistant would normally be required to work as a condi-
tion of funding, he or she may opt not to work only if he 
or she finds a source of outside fellowship aid.  Also, the 
stipend portion of the financial package given to assis-
tants is generally treated as part of university payroll and 
is subject to W-2 reporting and I-9 employment verifica-
tion requirements.  
Even though it is unnecessary to delve into the ques-
tion of whether the relationship between student assis-
tants and their universities is primarily economic or edu-
cational—we have overruled the Brown University
standard—the facts in this case do not suggest a primari-
ly educational relationship, but rather, simply point to the 
                                                                          
compensates student assistants for performing services that benefit the 
institution . . . such compensation encourages the student to do the 
work for more than educational benefits and thereby establishes an 
employment as well as an educational relationship”).
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difficulty of the analytical exercise required by the prior 
approach. 
While overlooked by the Brown University Board, 
there is undoubtedly a significant economic component 
to the relationship between universities, like Columbia, 
and their student assistants.  On average, private nonprof-
it colleges and universities generate a third of their reve-
nue from tuition, and 13 percent from government grants, 
contracts and appropriations.101  Columbia, for example, 
generates nearly a billion dollars in annual tuition reve-
nue and over a half-million in government grants and 
contracts.102
Teaching assistants frequently take on a role akin to 
that of faculty, the traditional purveyors of a university’s 
instructional output.  The teaching assistants conduct 
lectures, grade exams, and lead discussions.  Significant 
portions of the overall teaching duties conducted by uni-
versities are conducted by student assistants.  The dele-
gation of the task of instructing undergraduates, one of a 
university’s most important revenue-producing activities, 
certainly suggests that the student assistants’ relationship 
to the University has a salient economic character.  
While Columbia’s pool of student assistants consists of 
enrolled students who were selected based on the Uni-
versity’s academic admissions process, this fact is not 
inconsistent with an economic relationship.  Students 
pre-selected for their academic proficiency would natu-
rally tend to constitute a labor pool geared toward the 
endeavor of teaching or researching in a university set-
ting, and their usage as instructors and researchers 
achieves the efficiency of avoiding a traditional hiring 
process for these jobs.103
                                               
101 See National Center for Education Statistics, Postsecondary Rev-
enues by Source, available at
http://nces.ed.gov/programs/coe/pdf/Indicator_CUD/coe_cud_2015_06.
pdf.  
102 See Consolidated Financial Statements, The Trustees of Colum-
bia University in the City of New York, available at 
http://finance.columbia.edu/files/gateway/content/reports/ finan-
cials2015.pdf.  
103 The claim that universities could more inexpensively hire adjunct 
faculty to perform the duties also does not establish that the relationship 
is primarily educational.  Indeed, it is unclear that using students in 
these roles is more costly to a university.  As previously noted, a uni-
versity that makes use of an existing pool of student labor garners the 
efficiency benefit of avoiding costly labor searches.  Moreover, the 
financial packages offered to graduate students are dictated in part by 
the need to be competitive with other schools also seeking to attract top 
graduate students. Although it may pay student assistants more com-
pensation than it would need to pay to attract an employee hired on the 
open market, a university also receives the benefit of making itself 
more attractive in recruiting graduate students.  Compensation to a 
student assistant is offset, then, by the benefits of hiring students.  Thus, 
because it fails to account for all the benefits that accrue to a university 
by using its graduate students to fill assistantships, the argument that 
And, the fact that teaching may be a degree require-
ment in many academic programs does not diminish the 
importance of having students assist in the business of 
universities by providing instructional services for which 
undergraduate students pay tuition.104  Indeed, the fact 
that teaching assistants are thrust wholesale into many of 
the core duties of teaching—planning and giving lec-
tures, writing exams, etc., including for such critical 
courses as Columbia’s Core Curriculum—suggests that 
the purpose extends beyond the mere desire to help in-
culcate teaching skills.
We have no difficulty, then, in finding that all of the 
petitioned-for classifications here comprise statutory 
employees—with the possible exception of research as-
sistants.  That issue, as we explain next, is more compli-
cated in light of Board precedent.
2. Student Research Assistants
As indicated, Columbia argues that student research 
assistants have no common-law employment relationship 
with the University.  It relies on Leland Stanford’s de-
termination that certain externally-funded research assis-
tants were not employees.105  That holding was later ap-
plied by the NYU Board in finding that some research 
assistants in that case were not statutory employees, even 
as it reversed the overall exclusion of student assistants 
from the Act’s protections.106  Applying our holding to-
day regarding the employment status of student assis-
tants, we find that core elements of the reasoning in Le-
land Stanford are no longer tenable.  We further find 
that, under the common-law test discussed in our deci-
sion today, research assistants at Columbia are employ-
ees under the Act.      
In Leland Stanford, the student research assistants re-
ceived external funding to cover their tuition while they 
essentially went about pursuing their own individual ac-
                                                                          
student assistants are more costly to a university than an employee 
hired in the free market is not self-evidently true.
104 As the American Association of University Professors, an organi-
zation that represents professional faculty—the very careers that many 
graduate students aspire to—states in its brief, teaching abilities ac-
quired through teaching assistantships are of relatively slight benefit in 
the attainment of a career in higher education.  While the evidence does 
suggest that graduate research assistantships dovetail more strongly 
with the career/educational goals of graduate students than teaching 
assistantships, it is by no means clear that education overshadows eco-
nomics in the case of research assistants either.
105 Supra, 214 NLRB at 623.
106 See NYU, supra, 332 NLRB at 1209 fn.10, citing Leland Stan-
ford, supra (“[W]e agree that the Sackler graduate assistants and the 
few science department research assistants funded by external grants 
are properly excluded from the unit [because] [t]he evidence fails to 
establish that the research assistants perform a service for the Employer 
and, therefore, they are not employees as defined in Section 2(3) of the 
Act.”).
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ademic goals in a manner of their own choosing.  They 
were not subject to discharge for failure to perform satis-
factory work, but would at worst receive a non-passing 
grade for their coursework.  Further, the Board conclud-
ed, the award the research assistants received was not 
correlated to the nature or quantum of services they ren-
dered.  The Board also contrasted the student research 
assistants with non-student research associates who were 
employees.  The student researchers received none of the 
fringe benefits that these non-student employee research 
associates received.  And these non-student research as-
sociates already had their academic degrees, were under 
the direction of their department, and were subject to 
discharge.
In view of these facts, the Stanford Board found that 
the externally-funded research assistants were “primarily 
students,” and concluded that their relationship with the 
university was not one of employment because it was 
“not grounded on the performance of a specific task 
where both the task and the time of its performance is 
designated and controlled by an employer [but] [r]ather it 
is a situation of students within certain academic guide-
lines having chosen particular projects on which to spend 
the time necessary.”107  
Leland Stanford thus, in many respects, focused upon 
the absence of the common-law features of employment 
of the externally-funded research assistants.  It contrasted 
the research assistants with non-student, employee re-
search associates who worked under the direction of their 
department, and it noted that the work performed by the 
externally-funded research assistants was largely done at 
the students’ own discretion and for their own benefit.  It 
also observed that these student research assistants could 
not be disciplined in a traditional sense.  Their researcher 
status, and presumably their aid award, was not termina-
ble based on a failure to meet any obligations of the 
grant, undermining a claim that the aid was compensa-
tion.  
However, the Leland Stanford decision arguably sug-
gested that the mere fact that the performance of a task 
that advanced a student’s personal educational goals 
could negate an employment relationship.  It described 
the status of the research assistants as akin to “the situa-
tion of all students,” who work on academic projects, and 
suggested the importance of the fact that they were “sim-
ultaneously students” as well as researchers.108  Because 
Leland Stanford thus relied in part on the existence of a 
student relationship in determining employee status, ra-
ther than determining whether a common-law relation-
                                               
107 214 NLRB at 623.
108 Id.
ship existed, we now overrule it, alongside Brown Uni-
versity, as inconsistent with the approach adopted today, 
which better reflects the language and policies of the 
Act.109  
The premise of Columbia’s argument concerning the 
status of its research assistants is that because their work 
simultaneously serves both their own educational inter-
ests along with the interests of the University, they are 
not employees under Leland Stanford.  To the extent 
Columbia’s characterization of Leland Stanford is cor-
rect, we have now overruled that decision.  We have re-
jected an inquiry into whether an employment relation-
ship is secondary to or coextensive with an educational 
relationship.  For this reason, the fact that a research as-
sistant’s work might advance his own educational inter-
ests as well as the University’s interests is not a barrier to 
finding statutory-employee status.110   
Nonetheless, it remains the case that if a student re-
search assistant is not an employee under the common-
law test, we would not normally find the assistant to be 
an employee under the Act.  But there is nothing about 
the nature of student-assistant research that would auto-
matically imply an absence of the requisite control under 
the common-law test.  It is theoretically possible that 
funders may wish to further a student’s education by 
effectively giving the student unconditional scholarship 
aid, and allowing the student to pursue educational goals 
without regard to achieving any of the funder’s own par-
ticular research goals.  But where a university exerts the 
requisite control over the research assistant’s work, and 
specific work is performed as a condition of receiving 
the financial award, a research assistant is properly treat-
ed as an employee under the Act.  
The research assistants here clearly fall into this latter 
category of common-law employees.  The research of 
Columbia’s student assistants, while advancing the assis-
tants’ doctoral theses, also meets research goals associat-
ed with grants from which the University receives sub-
stantial income.111  The research assistants here work 
under the direction of their departments to ensure that 
                                               
109 Our dissenting colleague contends that the longstanding nature of 
the Board’s Leland Stanford precedent favors leaving its holding—that 
research assistants are not statutory employees—untouched. However, 
as we have already explained, we believe that the better view is that 
student assistants, including research assistants, should be regarded as
employees under the Act.    
110 In this respect, our decision is entirely consistent with other em-
ployee-status decisions under the Act involving individuals who work, 
at least in part, to advance personal interests.  See fn. 39–41, supra.
111 One can conceive of countless employment situations where the 
employee gains personally valuable professional experience and skills 
while simultaneously performing a valuable service for his or her em-
ployer.
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particular grant specifications are met.  Indeed, another 
feature of such funding is that the University typically 
receives a benefit from the research assistant’s work, as it 
receives a share of the grant as revenue, and it is relieved 
of any need to find other sources of funding for graduate 
students under a research grant; thus it has an incentive 
to ensure proper completion of the work in accordance 
with the grant.  Further, a research assistant’s aid pack-
age requires fulfillment of the duties defined in the grant, 
notwithstanding that the duties may also advance the 
assistant’s thesis, and thus the award is compensation.  
Students, when working as research assistants, are not 
permitted to simply pursue their educational goals at 
their own discretion, subject only to the general require-
ment that they make academic progress, as they would be 
in semesters where they were under some form of finan-
cial aid other than a research grant.112  
The funding here is thus not akin to scholarship aid 
merely passed through the University by a grantor with-
out specific expectations of the recipients.  Because Co-
lumbia directs the student research assistants’ work and 
the performance of defined tasks is a condition of the 
grant aid, we conclude that the research assistants in this 
case are employees under the Act.113  
Columbia argues that, even if research assistants gen-
erally are common-law employees, the research assis-
tants funded by a specific form of grants known as train-
ing grants present unique circumstances and lack the 
characteristics of common-law employment.  However, 
the record shows that Columbia, which receives revenue 
from these training grants, is charged with ensuring that 
research assistants thereunder receive appropriate train-
ing within a formalized program (consistent with the 
funder’s goal of having a well-trained workforce in bio-
medical and behavioral research), and accordingly it 
oversees and directs the research assistants who receive 
the grants.  Additionally, research assistants often receive 
funds from research and training grants simultaneously.  
Further, participation in specific training activities is a 
requirement for receipt of training grants; thus, notwith-
                                               
112 Stanford found that the fact that the university equalized financial 
packages for research assistants and other graduate students suggested 
that funding for research assistants was financial aid and not compensa-
tion. 214 NLRB at 622.  As previously discussed, we do not believe 
that Columbia’s practice to distribute the benefits it receives from stu-
dent-assistant labor, in order to equalize aid packages, demonstrates 
that funding for an assistantship is not compensation, given that the 
research work assigned in a given semester is a requirement for receipt 
of aid.  
113 Indeed, in NYU, the Board upheld the Regional Director’s deter-
mination that those research assistants who were “assigned specific 
tasks and . . . [who] work[ed] under the direction and control of the 
faculty member,” were employees eligible for inclusion in the unit.  See 
NYU, supra, 332 NLRB at 1221 fn.51.
standing the grantor’s statement that the grant aid is not 
salary, it is a form of compensation.
C. Student Assistants in the Petitioned-for Unit Share a 
Community of Interest
We now turn to the question of whether the petitioned-
for unit is a unit appropriate for collective bargaining.  
Columbia argues that the petitioned-for unit is inappro-
priate because it groups undergraduate and Master’s de-
gree student assistants together in the same unit with 
Ph.D. assistants.  According to Columbia, differences in 
pay and benefits, duties, and remunerative interests 
demonstrate the absence of a community of interest.  We 
disagree.  
The first and central right that Section 7 of the Act 
grants employees is “the right to self-organization, to 
form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain col-
lectively through representatives of their own choosing
. . . .”  Section 9(b) provides that “[t]he Board shall de-
cide in each case whether, in order to assure to employ-
ees the fullest freedom in exercising the rights guaran-
teed by this Act, the unit appropriate for the purposes of 
collective bargaining shall be the employer unit, craft 
unit, plant unit, or subdivision thereof.”  As recognized 
by the Supreme Court, Section 9(a) “suggests that em-
ployees may seek to organize ‘a unit’ that is ‘appropri-
ate’—not necessarily the single most appropriate unit.”114  
In other words, “[m]ore than one appropriate bargaining 
unit logically can be defined in any particular factual 
setting.”115
In making the determination of whether the proposed 
unit is an appropriate unit, the Board's “focus is on 
whether the employees share a ‘community of inter-
est.”’116  In determining whether employees in a pro-
posed unit share a community of interest, the Board ex-
amines:
[W]hether the employees are organized into a separate 
department; have distinct skills and training; have dis-
tinct job functions and perform distinct work, including 
inquiry into the amount and type of job overlap be-
tween classifications; are functionally integrated with 
the Employer's other employees; have frequent contact 
with other employees; interchange with other employ-
                                               
114 American Hospital Assn., 499 U.S. 606, 610 (1991) (emphasis in 
original).  See also Specialty Healthcare & Rehabilitation Center of 
Mobile, 357 NLRB 934, 942 (2011), enfd. 727 F.3d 552 (6th Cir. 
2013).
115 Country Ford Trucks, Inc. v. NLRB, 229 F.3d 1184, 1189 (D.C. 
Cir. 2000) (quoting Operating Engineers Local 627 v. NLRB, 595 F.2d 
844, 848 (D.C. Cir. 1979)).
116 Specialty Healthcare, supra, 357 NLRB at 942, quoting NLRB v. 
Action Automotive, Inc., 469 U.S. 490, 491 (1985).
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ees; have distinct terms and conditions of employment; 
and are separately supervised.117
Further, to honor the statutory command to maximize 
employees’ freedom in choosing a representative, the 
Board has held that a petitioner's desire concerning the 
unit “is always a relevant consideration.”118  Although 
Section 9(c)(5) of the Act provides that “the extent to 
which the employees have organized shall not be control-
ling,” the Supreme Court has made clear that the extent 
of organization may be “consider[ed] . . . as one factor” 
in determining if the proposed unit is an appropriate 
unit.119 We thus consider the unit expressed in the peti-
tion to be a factor, although not a determinative one.
In Specialty Healthcare and Rehabilitation Center of 
Mobile,120 the Board held that a unit is appropriate if the 
employees in the proposed unit constitute a readily iden-
tifiable grouping and share a community of interest.  
Here, the proposed unit consists of a readily identifiable 
grouping of employees: all student employees who pro-
vide instructional services and all research assistants at 
Columbia University’s campuses.  We further find that 
the employees in the unit share a community of interest 
and agree with the Regional Director who, in concluding 
the unit was appropriate, found substantial similarities 
among the types of work of all the student assistants in 
the proposed unit.  She noted that they work in similar 
settings (in labs and classrooms at the same university) 
and serve similar functions with respect to the Universi-
ty’s fulfillment of its teaching and research mission.  
Thus, the petitioned-for unit of student assistants per-
forming instructional services and research services pro-
vide supplemental educational services to the faculty and 
the University and therefore constitute a readily identifi-
able grouping of employees within the University’s op-
erations that share a community of interest.  
While Columbia argues that there are some dissimilari-
ties, such as differences in the difficulty and independ-
ence of work assignments, as well as in pay and benefits, 
among the categories of student assistants, we find that—
although there might potentially be other appropriate unit 
groupings among these student assistants—the peti-
tioned-for classifications share a sufficient community of 
interest to form an appropriate unit.  We note that all of 
the student assistants here are performing a supplemental 
educational service.  That is, their duties are functionally 
integrated into a system designed to meet the university’s 
teaching and research missions in non-faculty roles.  Al-
                                               
117 Specialty Healthcare, supra, 357 NLRB at 942 (quoting United 
Operations, Inc., 338 NLRB 123, 123 (2002)). 
118 Marks Oxygen Co., 147 NLRB 228, 230 (1964).
119 NLRB v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 380 U.S. 438, 442 (1965).
120 357 NLRB at 946.
though some of the assistantships undertaken by Ph.D. 
students may involve advanced duties, in many cases
their roles are similar to those of Master’s and under-
graduate assistants who fill related positions.  And even 
when the Ph.D. assistants take on more advanced roles, 
there is often still an overlap of job duties with Master’s 
and undergraduate student assistants.121  
Further, all student assistants work under the direction 
of the University.  Most are appointed on a semester-long 
basis and are paid in part through a tuition remission and 
in part via a bimonthly stipend.  Although it is the con-
tention of our dissenting colleague that the “broad array” 
of employees within the unit militates against its appro-
priateness, we note that the Act countenances broad units 
where there are factors establishing a community of in-
terest.  For example, the Board has held, consistent with 
the Act’s text, that similarly situated employees can form 
an appropriate employer-wide unit.122  We find under 
these circumstances that differences in level and type of 
compensation123 and some differences in the nature of 
work assignments, do not negate the shared community 
of interest of employees in the petitioned-for unit, given 
the many other relevant similarities.
Columbia also argues that, because they are in shorter-
term degree programs geared toward rapid graduation 
and job-market entry, Master’s and undergraduate stu-
dent assistants are less likely to be concerned with issues 
of housing costs, quality of health care, and availability 
of dependent health coverage.  Assuming the veracity of 
Columbia’s speculation regarding Master’s and under-
graduate students’ likely priorities, it is nonetheless the 
case that classifications in a unit need not have complete 
identity of interests for the unit to be appropriate.  While 
Master’s and undergraduate assistants may, arguably, 
                                               
121 Notably, a Columbia Vice-Provost testified to “considerable simi-
larity” between the teaching duties of a Master’s degree teaching assis-
tant and a Ph.D. appointed as a teaching fellow, ostensibly a higher-
difficulty position.  The record also indicates that, while Ph.D. assis-
tants take on the most advanced and independent teaching assignments, 
there are various types of discrete teaching duties, such as grading and 
leading discussion sections, that are performed by both undergradu-
ate/Master’s student assistants and Ph.D. assistants.
122 Sec. 9(b) provides, inter alia, that: “The Board shall decide in 
each case whether . . . the unit appropriate for the purposes of collective 
bargaining shall be the employer unit, craft unit, plant unit, or subdivi-
sion thereof.”  29 U.S.C. 159(b).  See also Hazard Express, Inc., 324 
NLRB 989 (1997) (finding appropriate a unit including “drivers, dock-
workers, and helpers and excluding clericals); Jackson’s Liquors, 208 
NLRB 807, 808 (1974) (“not[ing] that the employerwide unit, being 
one of the units listed in the Act as appropriate for bargaining, is pre-
sumptively appropriate”).
123 See Los Angeles Water & Power Employees’ Assn., 340 NLRB 
1232, 1236 (2003) (difference in pay not controlling as to unit determi-
nation in light of other similarities); Four Winds Services, 325 NLRB 
632, 632 (1998) (same).
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have some different priorities from those of Ph.D. assis-
tants, there are also overarching common interests.  For 
most student assistants, there will be a shared desire to 
successfully balance coursework with job responsibili-
ties, as well as a shared desire to mitigate the tuition and 
opportunity costs of being a student.  Additionally, all 
student assistants are likely to share a desire to address 
policies affecting job postings, pay periods, stipend dis-
bursement, and personal health insurance coverage.  Stu-
dent assistants also have common interests in developing 
guidelines for discipline and discharge and establishing a 
grievance-and-arbitration procedure.  While Ph.D. assis-
tants, as longer-term students, may be somewhat more 
concerned with certain types of remuneration, such as 
housing subsidies, their interests are certainly not at odds 
with those of the shorter-term employees.  Indeed the 
unit’s overarching interest in addressing issues pertaining 
to one’s simultaneous employment and enrollment as a 
student provides ample basis on which to pursue a com-
mon bargaining agenda. 
Therefore, applying traditional community of interest 
factors to these facts, we conclude that the petitioned-for 
unit is an appropriate unit. 124
D. None of the Petitioned-for Classifications Contain 
Temporary Employees Who Must Be Excluded From the 
Unit
Columbia argues that certain classifications must be 
excluded from the unit because they comprise temporary 
employees, who may not be included in the unit.  We 
reject this argument.
In its analysis of whether an employee should be ex-
cluded from a unit as a “temporary employee,” the Board 
focuses on “the critical nexus between an employee's 
temporary tenure and the determination whether he 
shares a community of interest with the unit employ-
ees.”125  To determine whether an alleged temporary em-
ployee shares a community of interest, the Board exam-
ines various factors, including “whether or not the em-
ployee’s tenure is finite and its end is reasonably ascer-
tainable, either by reference to a calendar date, or the 
completion of a specific job or event, or the satisfaction 
of the condition or contingency by which the temporary 
employment was created.”126
                                               
124 We stress that the bargaining relationship here pertains only to 
undergraduates’ employment relationship and does not interfere with 
any other role the university may play with respect to students’ aca-
demic or personal development.  Since undergraduate student assistants 
share a community of interest with the other student assistants, they are 
appropriately included in the same unit.  
125 Marian Medical Center, 339 NLRB 127, 128 (2003).
126 Id.
However, the determination is not based on the nature 
of an employee’s tenure in a vacuum; rather, the nature 
of the alleged temporary employees’ employment must 
be considered relative to the interests of the unit as a 
whole.  The practice of excluding temporary employees 
from a unit merely recognizes that, “as a general rule,” 
employees of a defined, short tenure are “likely” to have 
divergent interests from the rest of the unit.127  
Here, Columbia argues that undergraduate and termi-
nal Master’s assistants in the petitioned-for unit are 
“temporary” in the sense that they are employed for rela-
tively short, finite periods of time, averaging only about 
two (not necessarily continuous) semesters of work.   
However, all the employees in this unit, which we find to 
be an appropriate, serve finite terms.  Although the Ph.D. 
student assistants typically serve for the longest periods, 
all the classifications perform similar duties in (not nec-
essarily continuous) semester increments.128  Thus, in 
some sense, one could argue that all the student assistants 
here are temporary.  Yet the Board has made clear that 
finite tenure alone cannot be a basis on which to deny 
bargaining rights, because “[i]n many employment rela-
tionships, an employee may have a set tenure and, in that 
sense, may not have an indefinite departure date . . . .  To 
extend the definition of ‘temporary employee’ to [all] 
such situations, however, would be to make what was 
intended to be a limited exception swallow the whole.”129    
Therefore we must look beyond the finite tenure of the 
student assistants at issue, and consider whether and to 
what extent their tenure affects their community of inter-
est with the unit or their ability to engage in meaningful 
bargaining.130
Further, we find that Master’s and undergraduate stu-
dent assistants’ relatively short tenure, within the context 
of this unit, does not suggest a divergence of interests 
that would frustrate collective bargaining.131  In Manhat-
                                               
127 Id.
128 Indeed, to exclude Master’s and undergraduate student assistants 
here who share a community of interest with the unit as a whole might 
undercut the integrity of the overall bargaining unit, because these 
employees perform not-readily differentiable work compared to Ph.D. 
student assistants, and thus could easily be utilized as substitutes for 
bargaining unit employees. See generally Outokumpu Copper Frank-
lin, Inc., 334 NLRB 263, 263 (2001) (temporary employees who 
worked work side-by-side at same jobs under same supervision as other 
employees were properly included in unit).
129 Boston Medical, supra, 330 NLRB at 166.  
130 To the extent that cases like San Francisco Art Institute, 226 
NLRB 1251 (1976), suggest that the mere fact of being a student in 
short-term employment with one’s school renders one’s interests in the 
employment relationship too “tenuous,” such cases are incompatible 
with our holding here today and are overruled.
131 This case is distinguishable from Goddard College, 216 NLRB 
457, 458 (1975), cited by the dissent.  In that case there was a signifi-
cant difference in employment expectations between the visiting pro-
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tan College, 195 NLRB 65, 65–66 (1972), the Board 
found that faculty members on terminal contracts shared 
a community of interest with their colleagues for the du-
ration of their employment and were therefore properly 
included in a faculty bargaining unit.132  The Board has 
never held that, regardless of community of interest with 
the broader unit, arguably temporary employees should 
be denied bargaining rights altogether.133  If, under the 
specific circumstances of a case, alleged temporary em-
ployees possess a sufficient interest in bargaining over 
terms and conditions of employment to allow for suc-
cessful and stable collective bargaining on their behalf, 
they are permitted to bargain collectively within an ap-
propriate unit.134
Here, even the Master’s and undergraduate student as-
sistants typically serve more than one semester—and 
thus their tenure is not so ephemeral as to vitiate their 
interest in bargaining over terms and conditions of em-
ployment.  Indeed, a semester at Columbia is not some 
insignificant or arbitrary period of time spent performing 
a task, but rather it constitutes a recurring, fundamental 
unit of the instructional and research operations of the 
University.  And notwithstanding the length of any indi-
vidual assistant’s tenure, the University will continuously 
employ groups of Master’s and undergraduate student 
assistants to perform research and instructional duties 
across semesters (and, although the precise composition 
of these groups will differ from semester to semester, 
there will typically be some individual student assistants 
                                                                          
fessors, who typically worked at the university less than a year, and 
tenured faculty.  The question there was whether it would be appropri-
ate to combine individuals with a long-term relationship to an employer 
with those whose long-term interests lay elsewhere.  Here, as we have 
noted, all the employees—both the allegedly temporary Master’s and 
undergraduate assistants, as well as the Ph.D. assistants—serve finite 
periods in semester increments, during which they perform similar 
services to the University.  Further, as student assistants working during 
academic semesters, they will share common interests in addressing 
issues unique to their status, such as those involving the balancing of 
work and academic obligations.   See Goucher College, 364 NLRB No. 
71, slip op. at 2 & fn. 7 (2016) (finding that terminal-appointment fac-
ulty should be included in unit because they share a community of 
interest with nontenure faculty “that is more significant than whether or 
not they have a reasonable expectation of reappointment”).  Also, un-
like the visiting faculty in Goddard, most student assistants possess a 
long-term goal of achieving employment elsewhere, as opposed to 
cultivating a permanent relationship with the University.
132 See also Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, 218 NLRB 1435, 1437 
(1975).
133 See Kansas City Repertory Theatre, 356 NLRB 147, 147 (2010) 
(“The logical consequence of the Employer's argument is that tempo-
rary or intermittent employees cannot exercise the rights vested in 
employees by Section 9 of the Act. However, no such exclusion ap-
pears in the definition of employees or elsewhere in the Act.”).  
134 See Manhattan College, supra, at 65–66.
who are carried over from one semester to another).135  
Because the University’s employment of Master’s and 
undergraduate student assistants is regularly recurring, 
with some carryover between semesters, and their indi-
vidual tenures are neither negligible nor ad hoc, we be-
lieve that as a group, they, together with the Ph.D. assis-
tants, form a stable unit capable of engaging in meaning-
ful collective bargaining.136  
Accordingly, we find that none of the petitioned-for 
classifications consists of temporary employees who 
should be excluded from the unit by virtue of their finite 
tenure of employment.  
E. Voting Eligibility Formula
There remains the issue of which of the employees in 
the petitioned-for unit—some of whom, on account of 
intermittent semester appointments, may not be eligible 
to vote under the Board’s traditional eligibility date ap-
proach—should nonetheless be permitted to vote because 
of their continuing interest in the unit.  In this connec-
tion, although it does not fully address the eligibility 
question, the Petitioner has suggested in its brief that 
student assistants who have been appointed for at least 
one semester should be deemed eligible.  
We observe that the unique circumstances of student 
assistants’ employment manifestly raise potential voter 
eligibility issues.  The student assistants here tend to 
work for a substantial portion of their academic career, 
but not necessarily in consecutive semesters; thus, during 
any given semester, individuals with a continuing interest 
in the terms and conditions of employment of the unit 
may not be working.  The Board has long recognized that 
certain industries and types of employment, particularly 
those with patterns of recurring employment, may neces-
sitate rules governing employee eligibility.  The Board 
                                               
135 We are not, as the dissent suggests, establishing a special rule for 
student assistants.  Rather, we are applying relevant principles concern-
ing the establishment of units of employees, including some with rela-
tively short, finite tenures, to the particular circumstances of student
assistants.  The question we must ask before denying a category of 
employees the right to bargain collectively is whether their tenure pre-
cludes meaningful bargaining.  Otherwise, to deny bargaining rights 
merely because one has a short tenure, would be antithetical to the Act.  
The evidence here indicates that meaningful bargaining is possible 
within such a unit.  Notably, student assistant collective bargaining at 
public universities sometimes involves units of students without exclu-
sions based on expected duration of employment; yet there is no evi-
dence that this has proven an impediment to effective bargaining.  See, 
e.g., Collective Bargaining Agreement between Michigan State Univer-
sity and The Graduate Employees Union, Local 6196, AFT-
Michigan/AFL–CIO (May 2015—May 2019), supra.  
136 Cf. Kelly Bros. Nurseries, 140 NLRB 82, 85 (1962) (category of 
seasonal employees properly included in a bargaining unit where the 
employer relied on these employees to serve over recurring production 
seasons, and where there was some employee holdover from season to 
season).
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attempts to strike a balance between the need for an on-
going connection with a unit and concern over disenfran-
chising voters who have a continuing interest notwith-
standing their short-term, sporadic, or intermittent em-
ployment.137  Setting such rules on a pre-election basis 
by use of eligibility formulas also serves the efficiency 
goal of avoiding protracted post-election litigation over 
challenges to individual voters.
Such eligibility formulas attempt to include employees 
who, despite not being on the payroll at the time of the 
election, have a past history of employment that would 
tend to signify a reasonable prospect of future employ-
ment.138  We have traditionally devised these formulae 
by examining the patterns of employment within a job or 
industry, and determining what amount of past employ-
ment serves as an approximate predictor of the likelihood 
of future employment.
For example, in a case involving adjunct faculty, the 
Board noted the importance of “prevent[ing] an arbitrary 
distinction” which disenfranchises employees with a con-
tinuing interest in their employment within the unit but 
who happen not to be working at the time of the elec-
tion.139  In the particular circumstances of that case, the 
Board looked at factors including whether adjuncts had 
signed teaching contracts and the extent to which they 
had actually taught over previous semesters.140
Here, the record contains data concerning the average 
number of semesters worked relative to a student assis-
tant’s time enrolled at the University, as well as data 
concerning typical patterns of work over the academic 
career of a Ph.D. student assistant.  But neither the Re-
gional Director nor the parties have specifically ad-
dressed what an appropriate formula would be under 
these circumstances.  Having determined the appropriate 
unit, we therefore remand this case and instruct the Re-
gional Director to take appropriate measures, including 
reopening the record, if necessary, to establish an appro-
priate voting eligibility formula.
ORDER
The Regional Director’s Decision is reversed.  The 
proceeding is remanded to the Regional Director for fur-
                                               
137 See Steiny & Co., 308 NLRB 1323, 1325 (1992); Trump Taj Ma-
hal Casino, 306 NLRB 294 (1992).
138 See Trump Taj Mahal Casino, supra, 306 NLRB at 296 (reiterat-
ing Board’s obligation to be “flexible in . . . devis[ing] formulas . . . to 
afford employees with a continuing interest in employment the opti-
mum opportunity for meaningful representation”).
139 C.W. Post Center, 198 NLRB 453, 454 (1972).
140 Id.  See also Steiny, supra, 308 NLRB at 1326 (articulating for-
mula for construction work that accounts for non-continuous work 
patterns).
ther appropriate action consistent with this Decision and 
Order.
Dated, Washington, D.C.  August 23, 2016
______________________________________
Mark Gaston Pearce,              Chairman
______________________________________
Kent Y. Hirozawa,              Member
______________________________________
Lauren McFerran,              Member
(SEAL)            NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
MEMBER MISCIMARRA, dissenting.
In this case, my colleagues decide that college and 
university students are “employees” for purposes of col-
lective bargaining under the National Labor Relations 
Act (NLRA or Act) when serving in a variety of academ-
ic assistant positions.  An assortment of student positions 
are involved here:  the petitioned-for bargaining unit in-
cludes all “student employees”  who engage in “instruc-
tional services,” including “graduate and undergraduate 
Teaching Assistants,” “Teaching Fellows,” “Preceptors,” 
“Course Assistants,” “Readers,” and “Graders,” plus 
“Graduate Research Assistants” and “Departmental Re-
search Assistants.”  No distinctions are drawn based on 
subject, department, whether the student must already 
possess a bachelor’s or master’s degree, whether a par-
ticular position has other minimum qualifications, 
whether graduation is conditioned on successful perfor-
mance in the position, or whether different positions are 
differently remunerated.  As a result of today’s decision, 
all of these university student assistant positions1 are 
made part of a single, expansive, multi-faceted bargain-
ing unit.
I believe the issues raised by the instant petition re-
quire more thoughtful consideration than the Board ma-
jority’s decision gives them.  In particular, my colleagues 
                                               
1 For ease of reference, I use the terms college and university inter-
changeably.  For the same reason, I use the term student assistants to 
refer to all types of students encompassed within the petitioned-for 
bargaining unit—i.e., all “student employees” who engage in “instruc-
tional services,” including “graduate and undergraduate Teaching As-
sistants,” “Teaching Assistants,” “Teaching Fellows,” “Preceptors,” 
“Course Assistants,” “Readers,” and “Graders,” as well as “Graduate 
Research Assistants” and “Departmental Research Assistants.”
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disregard a fundamental fact that should be the starting 
point when considering whether to apply the NLRA to 
university students.  Full-time enrollment in a university 
usually involves one of the largest expenditures a student 
will make in his or her lifetime, and this expenditure is 
almost certainly the most important financial investment 
the student will ever make.  In the majority of cases, at-
tending college imposes enormous financial burdens on 
students and their families, requiring years of preparation 
beforehand and, increasingly, years of indebtedness 
thereafter.  Many variables affect whether a student will 
reap any return on such a significant financial invest-
ment, but three things are certain:  (i) there is no guaran-
tee that a student will graduate, and roughly 40 percent 
do not;2 (ii) college-related costs increase substantially 
the longer it takes a student to graduate, and roughly 60 
percent of undergraduate students do not complete de-
gree requirements within four years after they commence 
college;3 and (iii) when students do not graduate at all, 
there is likely to be no return on their investment in a 
college education.4       
I respect the views presented by my colleagues and by 
advocates on all sides regarding the issues in this case.  
However, Congress never intended that the NLRA and 
collective bargaining would be the means by which stu-
dents and their families might attempt to exercise control 
over such an extraordinary expense.  This is not a com-
mentary on the potential benefits associated with collec-
                                               
2 U.S. Department of Education, National Center for Education Sta-
tistics (NCES), The Condition of Education 2016, Undergraduate Re-
tention and Graduation Rates (excerpted at 
https://nces.ed.gov/fastfacts/display.asp?id=40) (last visited Aug. 5, 
2016).  The NCES reports that the “6-year graduation rate for first-
time, full-time undergraduate students who began their pursuit of a 
bachelor's degree at a 4-year degree-granting institution in fall 2008 
was 60 percent. That is, 60 percent of first-time, full-time students who 
began seeking a bachelor's degree at a 4-year institution in fall 2008 
completed the degree at that institution by 2014.”  Id.
3 Dr. Peter Cappelli, Will College Pay Off?, p. 18 (Public Affairs 
2015) (hereinafter “Cappelli”).  See also Complete College America, 
Four-Year Myth: Make College More Affordable—Restore the Promise 
of Graduating on Time, pp. 4, 6 (2014) (http://completecollege.org/wp-
content/uploads/2014/11/4-Year-Myth.pdf) (reporting that only 36 
percent of students attending flagship 4-year college bachelor degree 
programs graduate on time); Danielle Douglas-Gabriel, Why So Many 
Students Are Spending Six Years Getting a College Degree, Washing-
ton Post, Dec. 2, 2014 (https://www.washingtonpost.
com/news/wonk/wp/2014/12/02/why-so-many-students-are-spending-
six-years-getting-a-college-degree/) (last visited Aug. 5, 2016).
4 University coursework may result in various personal benefits even 
if students fail to earn a degree.  However, there is little doubt that the 
financial return on the investment required to attend college requires 
graduation.  See, e.g., Cappelli, p. 48 (“The biggest cost associated with 
going to college, though, is likely to be the risk that a student does not 
graduate on time or, worse, drops out altogether. There is virtually no 
payoff from college if you don’t graduate.”).
tive bargaining in the workplace.  Rather, it is a recogni-
tion that for students enrolled in a college or university, 
their instruction-related positions do not turn the academ-
ic institution they attend into something that can fairly be 
characterized as a “workplace.”   For students, the least 
important consideration is whether they engage in collec-
tive bargaining regarding their service as research assis-
tants, graduate assistants, preceptors, or fellows, which is 
an incidental aspect of their education.  If one regards 
college as a competition, this is one area where “winning 
isn’t everything, it is the only thing,” and I believe win-
ning in this context means fulfilling degree requirements, 
hopefully on time.5  
The Board has no jurisdiction over efforts to ensure 
that college and university students satisfy their postsec-
ondary education requirements.  However, Congress has 
certainly weighed in on the subject:  an array of federal 
statutes and regulations apply to colleges and universi-
ties, administered by the U.S. Department of Education, 
led by the Secretary of Education.  My colleagues disre-
gard the Board’s responsibility to accommodate this ex-
tensive regulatory framework.  In addition, I believe col-
lective bargaining and, especially, the potential resort to 
economic weapons protected by our statute fundamental-
ly change the relationship between university students, 
including student assistants, and their professors and ac-
ademic institutions.  Collective bargaining often produc-
es short-term winners and losers, and a student assistant 
in some cases may receive some type of transient benefit 
as a result of collective bargaining pursuant to today’s 
decision.  Yet there are no guarantees, and they might 
end up worse off.  Moreover, I believe collective bar-
gaining is likely to detract from the far more important 
goal of completing degree requirements in the allotted 
time, especially when one considers the potential conse-
quences if students and/or universities resort to economic 
weapons against one another.  I also believe that the 
Board’s processes and procedures are poorly suited to 
deal with representation and unfair labor practice cases 
involving students.  Add these up, and the sum total is 
uncertainty instead of clarity, and complexity instead of 
                                               
5 The expression “winning isn’t everything, it’s the only thing” is 
commonly attributed to legendary football coach Vince Lombardi, who 
was the head coach for the Green Bay Packers from 1959 to 1967.  
However, it appears to have been originated by Henry Russell (Red) 
Sanders, who was the head coach of the University of California, Los 
Angeles (UCLA) Bruins football team from 1949 to 1957.  See Wik-
ipedia, Winning isn’t everything; it’s the only thing 
(https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Winning_isn%27t_everything;_it%27s_t
he_only_thing) (last visited Aug. 5, 2016).  Red Sanders also referred 
to the rivalry between UCLA and the University of Southern California 
(USC) and famously stated:  “Beating [USC] is not a matter of life or 
death, it’s more important than that.”  Id. 
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simplicity, with the risks and uncertainties associated 
with collective bargaining—including the risk of break-
down and resort to economic weapons—governing the 
single most important financial decision that students and 
their families will ever make.  
For these reasons, I agree with former Member Brame, 
who stated that the Board resembles the “foolish repair-
man with one tool—a hammer—to whom every problem 
looks like a nail; we have one tool—collective bargain-
ing—and thus every petitioning individual looks like 
someone’s ‘employee.’”  Boston Medical Center Corp.,
330 NLRB 152, 182 (1999) (Member Brame, dissent-
ing).  Accordingly, as explained more fully below, I re-
spectfully dissent.
DISCUSSION
The Board here changes the treatment that has been af-
forded student assistants throughout the Act’s history of 
80 years, with the exception of a four-year period that 
was governed by the Board’s divided opinion in New 
York University (NYU).6  Prior to NYU, the Board in 
Adelphi University7 and The Leland Stanford Junior Uni-
versity8 held that various student assistants could not be 
included in petitioned-for units.  After NYU, the Board 
similarly held that various student assistants were not 
employees in Brown University.9       
I disagree with my colleagues’ decision to apply the 
Act to college and university student assistants.  In my 
view, this change is unsupported by our statute, and it is 
ill-advised based on substantial considerations, including 
those that far outweigh whether students can engage in 
collective bargaining over the terms and conditions of 
education-related positions while attempting to earn an 
undergraduate or graduate degree.  
The Supreme Court has stated that “the authority struc-
ture of a university does not fit neatly within the statutory 
scheme” set forth in the NLRA.  NLRB v. Yeshiva Uni-
versity, 444 U.S. 672, 680 (1980).  Likewise, the Board 
has recognized that a university, which relies so heavily 
on collegiality, “does not square with the traditional au-
thority structures with which this Act was designed to 
cope in the typical organizations of the commercial 
world.”  Adelphi University, 195 NLRB at 648.  The ob-
vious distinction here has been recognized by the Su-
preme Court and the Board:  the lecture hall is not the 
factory floor, and the “industrial model cannot be im-
posed blindly on the academic world.”  Syracuse Univer-
                                               
6 332 NLRB 1205 (2000).
7 195 NLRB 639, 640 (1972).
8 214 NLRB 621(1974).
9 342 NLRB 483 (2004).
sity, 204 NLRB 641, 643 (1973); see also Yeshiva, 444 
U.S. at 680.
The Board has an uneven track record in its efforts to 
apply the NLRA to colleges, universities and other edu-
cational institutions.  In Yeshiva, the Board summarily 
rejected the university’s position that its faculty members 
were managerial employees who were exempt from the 
Act.  The Supreme Court reversed, finding that the facul-
ty members constituted managerial employees and that 
the Board’s conclusions were neither consistent with the 
Act nor rationally based on articulated facts.  444 U.S. at 
686–691. 
In NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 U.S. 490 
(1979), the Supreme Court rejected the Board’s exercise 
of jurisdiction over lay faculty members at two groups of 
Catholic high schools, concluding that to do so would 
give rise to “serious First Amendment questions” involv-
ing church/state entanglement and that there was insuffi-
cient evidence Congress intended that “teachers in 
church-operated schools should be covered by the Act.”  
Id. at 504–507; see also Pacific Lutheran University, 361 
NLRB No. 157 (2014).10  
In Boston Medical Center, a divided Board found that 
interns, residents and fellows at a teaching hospital were 
employees under the Act.11  However, the majority did 
not change the status of university student assistants, 
whom the Board had previously determined not to be 
employees.12  And as noted previously, except for the 
four-year period governed by NYU,13 the Board has con-
sistently held that university student assistants are not
employees,14 most recently in Brown University,15 where 
the Board reaffirmed that a student assistant’s relation-
ship with a university is “primarily educational.”  Brown, 
342 NLRB at 487.  
                                               
10 Cf. Northwestern University, 362 NLRB No. 167 (2015) (declin-
ing to exercise jurisdiction over grant-in-aid scholarship football play-
ers without reaching the question of “employee” status under the 
NLRA).
11  330 NLRB at 159–165.  Members Hurtgen and Brame dissented.  
Id. at 168–170 (Member Hurtgen, dissenting); id. at 170–182 (Member 
Brame, dissenting).  
12 The majority in Boston Medical explained that hospital interns, 
residents and fellows—referred to as “house staff”—were materially 
different from students, including student assistants:  
[W]hile house staff possess certain attributes of student status, they are 
unlike many others in the traditional academic setting.  Interns, resi-
dents, and fellows do not pay tuition or student fees.  They do not take 
typical examinations in a classroom setting, nor do they receive grades 
as such.  They do not register in a traditional fashion.  Their education 
and student status is geared to gaining sufficient experience and 
knowledge to become Board-certified in a specialty.
Id. at 161 (footnote omitted).
13 332 NLRB at 1205.
14 See fns. 7-9, supra.
15 342 NLRB at 483.
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I agree with the Board majority’s reasoning in Brown.  
There, the Board considered whether “graduate student 
assistants who are admitted into, not hired by, a universi-
ty, and for whom supervised teaching or research is an 
integral component of their academic development” 
should be deemed employees under the Act.  Brown, 342 
NLRB at 483.  The Board majority held that these indi-
viduals were not “employees,” based on the conclusion 
that “graduate student assistants, who perform services at 
a university in connection with their studies, have a pre-
dominately academic, rather than economic, relationship 
with their school.”  Id.  The Board majority stated that 
the “fundamental premise of the Act” was “to cover eco-
nomic relationships,” and the majority recognized “the 
simple, undisputed fact that all the petitioned-for indi-
viduals [were] students and must first be enrolled at 
Brown” before they could be graduate assistants.  Id. at 
488.   The majority emphasized that the work done by 
graduate assistants was “part and parcel of the core ele-
ments of the Ph.D. degree.”  Id.  In the case of most doc-
toral students who provided instruction, for example, the 
majority observed that “teaching is so integral to their 
education that they will not get the degree until they sat-
isfy that requirement.”  Id.; see also Leland Stanford, 214 
NLRB at 621, 622 (student research assistants who re-
ceived stipends to perform research projects were not 
employees, since the research was “part of the learning 
process” and a step leading to the “thesis and . . . to-
ward[s] the goal of obtaining the Ph.D. degree”).  The 
Board majority in Brown concluded it was likely that 
collective bargaining would impermissibly interfere with 
academic freedom and be “detrimental to the educational 
process.”16  The majority explained:   
Imposing collective bargaining would have a deleteri-
ous impact on overall educational decisions by the . . . 
faculty and administration.  These decisions would in-
clude broad academic issues involving class size, time, 
length, and location, as well as issues over graduate as-
sistants’ duties, hours, and stipends.  In addition, collec-
tive bargaining would intrude upon decisions over who, 
what, and where to teach or research—the principal 
prerogatives of an educational institution . . . .17
Apart from my belief that the Board correctly ad-
dressed these issues in Brown, I especially disagree with 
several aspects of my colleagues’ opinion to the contrary.
                                               
16  Brown, 342 NLRB at 493. 
17 Brown, 342 NLRB at 490.  Cf. Yeshiva, 444 U.S. at 686 (recog-
nizing that academic freedom applies not only to the clash of ideas 
among faculty but also to debate concerning “which students will be 
admitted, retained, and graduated”). 
1.  The Financial Investment Associated With a Uni-
versity Education, and the Mistake of Making Academic 
Success Subservient to the Risks and Uncertainties of 
Collective Bargaining and the Potential Resort to Eco-
nomic Weapons.  Given the critical importance of higher 
education, I believe the time is long past when the ques-
tion of whether to apply the NLRA to students can ap-
propriately be decided based on the standard lines of 
division that are commonplace in matters that come be-
fore the Board.  Many parties tend to favor union repre-
sentation and collective bargaining generally, and one 
can reasonably expect many of these parties to support 
union representation and collective bargaining for uni-
versity student assistants.  Likewise, when some parties 
tend to oppose union representation or collective bar-
gaining, it is unsurprising when they oppose these things 
for student assistants as well.  The Board’s role should be 
different.  We administer a statute enacted by Congress 
that was adopted with a focus on conventional workplac-
es, not universities.  For this reason, as noted above, the 
Board and the courts have recognized that unique issues 
arise in applying the NLRA to academic work settings, 
even when dealing with college and university faculty.  
Moreover, the NLRB has no regulatory authority over 
efforts to ensure that undergraduates and graduate stu-
dents at colleges and universities satisfy their degree re-
quirements.  And the Board should not ignore the fact 
that, for the vast majority of students, attendance at a 
college or university has a paramount goal—to obtain a 
degree—and this goal, if attained, is usually achieved at 
enormous expense.  Neither should the Board disregard 
the unfortunate reality in the United States that many 
students never receive their degree.18         
I believe my colleagues—though armed with good in-
tentions—engage in analysis that is too narrow, exclud-
ing everything that is unique about the situation of col-
lege and university students.  In particular, my colleagues 
disregard what hangs in the balance when a student’s 
efforts to attain an undergraduate or graduate degree are 
governed by the risks and uncertainties of collective bar-
gaining and the potential resort to economic weapons by 
students and universities.  What hangs in the balance has 
                                               
18 College graduation rates in a significant number of other countries 
are higher than in the United States (although it appears difficult to 
obtain recent data that permit a reliable comparison).  See, e.g., Institute 
of Education Sciences, National Center for Education Statistics, Youth 
Indicators 2011 (identifying 12 countries having higher college gradua-
tion rates than the United States among first-time college students, and 
11 countries having lower rates) (https://nces.ed.gov/pubs2012/
2012026/chapter2_23.asp and https://nces.ed.gov/pubs2012/
2012026/figures/figure_23.asp) (last viewed Aug. 1, 2016);  Cappelli, 
p. 29 (“[T]he United States has among the worst [college] graduation 
rates of any country.”). 
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immense importance, and it does not come cheap for the 
great majority of undergraduate and graduate students 
and their families.  As one commentator has explained, 
“college is for many people the biggest financial decision 
they will ever make,” it “makes more demands on our 
cognitive abilities than most of us will ever see again in 
our lives,” and the “biggest cost associated with going to 
college . . . is likely to be the risk that a student does not 
graduate on time or, worse, drops out altogether.  There 
is virtually no payoff from college if you don’t gradu-
ate.”19
My colleagues ignore these considerations, and they 
disclaim any responsibility to address anything other 
than the need to promote collective bargaining.  In their 
words: 
We have put suppositions aside today and have instead 
carefully considered the text of the Act as interpreted 
by the Supreme Court, the Act’s clearly stated policies, 
the experience of the Board, and the relevant empirical 
evidence drawn from collective bargaining in the uni-
versity setting.  This is not a case . . . where the Board 
must accommodate the National Labor Relations Act 
with some other federal statute related to private uni-
versities that might weigh against permitting student 
assistants to seek union representation and engage in 
collective bargaining.20
Regarding examples where bargaining involving student 
assistants (according to Columbia University and other par-
ties) “has proven detrimental to the pursuit of the school’s 
educational goals,” my colleagues state that “labor disputes 
are a fact of economic life,” and “the Act is intended to ad-
dress them.”21  They conclude:  
The National Labor Relations Act . . . governs only the 
employee-employer relationship.  For deciding the le-
gal and policy issues in this case, then, it is not disposi-
tive that the student-teacher relationship involves dif-
ferent interests than the employee-employer relation-
ship; that the educational process is individual, while 
collective bargaining is focused on the group; and that 
promoting equality of bargaining power is not an aim 
of higher education.  Even conceded, all these points 
simply confirm that collective bargaining and educa-
tion occupy different institutional spheres.22
I disagree with this analysis because it is contrary to 
what the Supreme Court has stated repeatedly is the 
“‘primary function and responsibility of the Board,’” 
                                               
19 Cappelli, pp. 8, 26, 48 (emphasis added).  See also fns. 2-3, supra 
and accompanying text.
20 Majority opinion, supra, slip op. at 12 (emphasis added).
21 Majority opinion, supra, slip op. at 10 (emphasis added).
22 Majority opinion, supra, slip op. at 7 (emphasis added).
which is “‘applying the general provisions of the Act to
the complexities of industrial life.’”  Ford Motor Co. v. 
NLRB, 441 U.S. 488, 496 (1979) (quoting NLRB v. In-
surance Agents, 361 U.S. 477, 499 (1960); NLRB v. Erie 
Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221, 236 (1963)); see also 
NLRB v. J. Weingarten, Inc., 420 U.S. 251, 266-267 
(1975) (“The responsibility to adapt the Act to changing 
patterns of industrial life is entrusted to the Board.”).  
The instant case does not involve “industrial life.”23  
Yet this only serves to reinforce the inappropriateness of 
“blindly” imposing collective bargaining and the rest of 
the NLRA on students in “the academic world.”  Syra-
cuse University, 204 NLRB at 643; see also Yeshiva, 444 
U.S. at 680; Adelphi University, 195 NLRB at 648.  The 
Board has applied the NLRA to college and university 
faculty members, which has presented its own challeng-
es, as noted previously.  The best interests of students, 
however, necessarily revolves around whether they ob-
tain the education that costs so much in time and money 
and means so much to their future.  The Board has no 
expertise regarding these issues, and Congress did not 
adopt our statute to advance the best interests of college 
and university students.  This makes it inappropriate to 
summarily dismiss concerns in this area as being “not 
dispositive.”     
Even more objectionable is my colleagues’ statement 
that the instant case involves no need to “accommodate 
the National Labor Relations Act with some other federal 
statute related to private universities that might weigh 
against permitting student assistants to seek union repre-
sentation and engage in collective bargaining.”24  This is 
contrary to Southern Steamship Co. v. NLRB, 316 U.S. 
31, 47 (1942), where the Supreme Court stated that “the 
Board has not been commissioned to effectuate the poli-
cies of the [Act] so single-mindedly that it may wholly 
ignore other and equally important Congressional objec-
tives.” 
Regarding the need to accommodate other “Congres-
sional objectives,” id., there is no shortage of federal 
mandates applicable to colleges and universities that, to 
borrow my colleagues’ words, “might weigh against 
permitting student assistants to seek union representation 
and engage in collective bargaining.”  Again, a broad 
range of federal statutes and regulations apply to colleges 
                                               
23 When the NLRA was adopted, Congress contemplated that the 
Act would primarily apply to industrial plants and manufacturing facili-
ties.  Sec. 1 of the Act refers to “industrial strife or unrest” and sets 
forth a policy to encourage “practices fundamental to the adjustment of 
industrial disputes,” and the Supreme Court has acknowledged that the 
“Act was intended to accommodate the type of management-employee 
relations that prevail in the pyramidal hierarchies of private industry.”  
Yeshiva, 444 U.S. at 680.
24 Majority opinion, supra, slip op. at 12.
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and universities, with significant involvement by the U.S. 
Department of Education, led by the Secretary of Educa-
tion.  Relevant laws include, among many others, the 
Higher Education Opportunity Act, enacted in 2008,25
which reauthorized the Higher Education Act of 1965,26
and the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act 
(FERPA), enacted in 1974.27  These statutes govern, 
among other things, the accreditation of colleges and 
universities, the enhancement of quality, the treatment of 
student assistance, graduate/postsecondary improvement 
programs, and the privacy of student records.  In 2015, a 
task force created by a bipartisan group of U.S. Senators 
reviewed the Department of Education’s regulation of 
colleges and universities and recommended, among other 
things, that the Department’s regulations “be related to 
education, student safety, and stewardship of federal 
funds” and “not stray from clearly stated legislative in-
tent.”28  The extensive federal regulation of colleges and 
universities focuses on access, availability, affordability 
and effectiveness, all of which relate to the ability of 
students to satisfy educational objectives.  This supports 
my view that collective bargaining—and especially the 
resort to economic weapons between and among student 
assistants, faculty members, and administrators—is like-
ly to substantially affect the educational process, separate 
from any impact on the economic interests of student 
assistants. 
Furthermore, it is already clear that current Board law, 
if applied to university student assistants, may contradict 
federal education requirements.  For example, FERPA 
broadly restricts the disclosure of educational records, 
including student disciplinary records.29  However, cur-
                                               
25 Pub. L. 110–315 (2008).
26 Pub. L. 89–329 (1965).  The Higher Education Act of 1965 was 
reauthorized in 1968, 1972, 1976, 1980, 1986, 1992, 1998, and 2008.  It 
was extended through 2015, and reauthorization bills remain pending in 
Congress.  See U.S. News University, House Approves Five Bipartisan 
Bills to Improve Higher Education Act (July 15, 2016) (https://www.
usnewsuniversitydirectory.com/news/paying-for-school/house-
approves-five-bipartisan-bills-to-improve-higher-education-act/) (last 
viewed July 28, 2016).
27 Pub. L. 93–380 (1974).  FERPA has been amended multiple times 
since its initial passage and may be found in its current form at 20 
U.S.C. § 1232g.
28 Task Force on Federal Regulation of Higher Education,  Recali-
brating Regulation of Colleges and Universities, pp. 2, 4 (2015) 
(http://www.help.senate.gov/imo/media/
Regulations_Task_Force_Report_2015_FINAL.pdf) (last visited Aug. 
5, 2016). The Senate Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and 
Pensions also held a hearing on February 24, 2015 devoted to the Task 
Force’s report.  See http://www.help.senate.gov/hearings/recalibrating-
regulation-of-colleges-and-universities-a-report-from-the-task-force-
on-government-regulation-of-higher-education (Feb. 24, 2015) (last 
viewed July 28, 2016). 
29 See http://www2.ed.gov/policy/gen/guid/fpco/brochures/postsec. 
html (last viewed Aug. 3, 2016) (indicating that “student disciplinary 
rent Board law, if applied to university students, would 
require the disclosure of confidential witness statements 
(absent proof that the witnesses required protection from 
retaliation in the particular circumstances presented),30
and Board law would prevent university officials from 
routinely requesting nondisclosure of matters discussed 
in investigatory interviews involving student assistants.31
                                                                          
records are protected as education records under FERPA,” although 
disclosure without the student’s consent is permitted in certain circum-
stances).  FERPA regulations indicate that “education records” do not 
include records relating to employees of an educational institution, but 
this exclusion applies only if employment-related records “[r]elate 
exclusively to the individual in that individual’s capacity as an employ-
ee.”  34 CFR § 99.3 (defining “education records”). According to the 
U.S. Department of Education, the employment-related records of 
“graduate student teaching fellows/assistants,” whose appointments are 
contingent on being students, constitute “education records” subject to 
FERPA’s nondisclosure requirements.  See Department of Education, 
Letter of technical assistance to American Federation of Teachers re: 
disclosure of information on teaching assistants, available at:  
http://www2.ed.gov/policy/gen/guid/fpco/ferpa/library/aft.html (Aug. 
21, 2000) (last viewed Aug. 3, 2016) (hereinafter “Dept. of Education, 
AFT letter”).  In short, if a student complains about sex harassment by 
a student assistant, which may result in academic suspension or expul-
sion, for example, it appears clear that FERPA confidentiality require-
ments would apply to the investigative records, possibly including 
witness statements, directly contrary to NLRB law potentially requiring 
their disclosure.  See fns. 30-31, infra.  Because of FERPA’s privacy 
requirements, there will undoubtedly be additional conflicts with 
NLRB disclosure obligations in other contexts, including union infor-
mation requests to which employers must respond under NLRA Sec. 
8(a)(5).  See Dept. of Education, AFT letter, supra (information re-
quested by union representing public university student assistants can-
not be disclosed without the student assistants’ consent); see also 
http://www2.ed.gov/
policy/gen/guid/fpco/ferpa/library/josephambash.html (Feb. 25, 2002) 
(last viewed Aug. 3, 2016) (teaching assistants’ hours of work, stipend, 
length of contract, employment category, and selection for layoff are 
educational records protected from disclosure by FERPA).
Even before the Board majority decided to apply the NLRA to stu-
dent assistants and thus create inconsistencies with other federal regula-
tions applicable to colleges and universities, the Board’s interpretation 
of the NLRA was contrary to other federal agency requirements and 
recommendations.  For example, the Board’s disclosure requirements 
applicable to workplace investigations and witness statements conflict 
with guidance from the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 
(EEOC) regarding precisely the same issues.  See American Baptist 
Homes of the West d/b/a Piedmont Gardens, 362 NLRB No. 139, slip 
op. at 12–13 (2015) (Member Johnson, dissenting in part); Report of 
the Co-Chairs of the EEOC Select Task Force on the Study of Harass-
ment in the Workplace, available at:  
http://www.btlaborrelations.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/eeoc-
report-on-sexual-harassment.pdf (June 2016) (last viewed Aug. 4, 
2016) (noting “strong support” from stakeholders “for the proposition 
that workplace investigations should be kept as confidential as is possi-
ble,” but also observing that “an employer’s ability to maintain confi-
dentiality . . . has been limited in some instances by decisions of the 
National Labor Relations Board,” and concluding that the “privacy of 
both the accuser and the accused should be protected to the greatest 
extent possible, consistent with legal obligations”).
30 See Piedmont Gardens, supra, 362 NLRB No. 139.
31 See Banner Estrella Medical Center, 362 NLRB No. 137 (2015).
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My colleagues apparently agree that “promoting equal-
ity of bargaining power is not an aim of higher educa-
tion.”32  It is also clear that collective bargaining by stu-
dents is not the focus of the numerous federal laws and 
regulations that apply to colleges and universities.  These 
laws and regulations are designed, directly or indirectly, 
to enhance the quality of education, to strengthen equal 
access to higher education, and to eliminate potential 
obstacles to academic success.  There is no reasonable 
justification for the Board’s failure to acknowledge the 
overriding importance of these non-employment issues 
for college and university students.  
Nor can the Board freely disregard the fact that the po-
tential resort to economic weapons is part and parcel of 
collective bargaining.  Therefore, applying our statute to 
university student assistants may prevent them from 
completing undergraduate and graduate degree require-
ments in the allotted time, which is the primary reason 
they attend colleges and universities at such great ex-
pense.  It is not an adequate response to summarily dis-
miss this issue, as the majority does, with the common-
place observation that “labor disputes are a fact of eco-
nomic life.”  For the students who may find themselves 
embroiled in them, labor disputes between universities 
and student assistants may have devastating consequenc-
es. 
Conventional work settings feature many examples of 
constructive collective-bargaining relationships.  Like-
wise, one cannot assume that all or most negotiations 
involving student assistants at universities would result 
in strikes, slowdowns, lockouts, and/or litigation.  How-
ever, there is no doubt that economic weapons and the 
threatened or actual infliction of economic injury are 
central elements in collective bargaining to which resort 
may be made when parties are unable to reach agree-
ment.  As I stated in American Baptist Homes of the West 
d/b/a Piedmont Gardens, 364 NLRB No. 13, slip op. at 9 
(2016) (Member Miscimarra, dissenting in part), one 
must “differentiate between what one would prefer to see 
in collective bargaining, and what role Congress contem-
plated for economic weapons as part of the collective-
bargaining process.”  I elaborated as follows:
What one hopes to see in any collective-bargaining 
dispute is its successful resolution without any party’s 
resort to economic weapons.  But what Congress in-
tended was for the Board to preserve the balance of 
competing interests—including potential resort to eco-
nomic weapons—that Congress devised as the engine 
driving parties to resolve their differences and to enter 
into successful agreements.  As the Supreme Court 
                                               
32 Majority opinion, supra, slip op. at 7.
stated in NLRB v. Insurance Agents’ International Un-
ion, 361 U.S. 477, 487–489 (1960), employers and un-
ions in collective bargaining “proceed from contrary 
and to an extent antagonistic viewpoints and concepts 
of self-interest. . . . The presence of economic weapons 
in reserve, and their actual exercise on occasion by the 
parties, is part and parcel of the system that the Wag-
ner and Taft-Hartley Acts have recognized.”33
When the Board transplants our statute into the univer-
sity setting and places students in a bargaining relation-
ship with the university, experience demonstrates that we 
cannot assume bargaining will be uneventful.  Collective 
bargaining may evoke “extraordinarily strong feelings” 
and give rise to a “sharp clash between seemingly irrec-
oncilable positions,” and when parties resort to various 
tactics in support of their respective positions, “such tac-
tics are indeed ‘weapons,’” and “[n]obody can be con-
fused about their purpose:  they are exercised with the 
intention of inflicting severe and potentially irreparable 
injury, often causing devastating damage to businesses 
and terrible consequences for employees.”34  As the court 
stated in NLRB v. Wire Products Mfg. Corp., 484 F.2d 
760, 765 (7th Cir. 1973), “[t]he strike is a potent eco-
nomic weapon which may, and often is, wielded with 
disastrous effect on its employer target.”35
                                               
33 Id., slip op. at 9 (Member Miscimarra, dissenting in part) (empha-
sis in original and emphasis added).
34 Id., slip op. at 10 (Member Miscimarra, dissenting in part).
35 My colleagues refer to what they characterize as “empirical evi-
dence” that, in their view, suggests collective bargaining involving 
student assistants has been undertaken successfully at public universi-
ties (where bargaining is typically governed by state public sector labor 
laws, which generally restrict or eliminate the right to strike) and at a 
private university on a non-NLRB-supervised basis (New York Univer-
sity). My colleagues state that certain agreements provide for “defined 
rights concerning courses, course content, course assignments, exams, 
class size, grading policies and methods of instruction, as well as grad-
uate students’ progress on their own degrees,” and according to the 
majority, this shows that “parties can and successfully have navigated 
delicate topics near the intersection of the university’s dual role as 
educator and employer.”   Majority opinion, supra, slip op. at 9. Co-
lumbia University and other parties have identified cases where bar-
gaining by student assistants “has proven detrimental to the pursuit of 
the school’s educational goals,” with “strikes and grievances over 
teaching workload and tuition waivers” and “grievances over classroom 
assignments and eligibility criteria for assistantships,” but my col-
leagues dismiss these examples as “labor disputes” that are merely a 
“fact of economic life.” Majority opinion, supra, slip op. at 10.
I disagree with my colleagues’ selective attachment of significance 
to the examples of peaceful negotiations involving student assistants—
none of which involves economic weapons permitted under the 
NLRA—and with their summary discounting of examples that go the 
other way.  In my view, what should be controlling here are two unas-
sailable propositions:  collective bargaining under the NLRA involves 
the potential use of leverage through threatened or inflicted economic 
injury; and even among parties that negotiate in good faith with the best 
intentions, disputes involving resort to protected economic weapons by 
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Of course, determining that student assistants are “em-
ployees” and have the right to be represented by a union 
under the NLRA does not mean they will choose to be 
represented.  Likewise, as stated above, I am not predict-
ing that most negotiations involving student assistants 
will involve resort to economic weapons.  Nonetheless, 
in this particular context, I believe collective bargaining 
and its attendant risks and uncertainties will tend to de-
tract from the primary reason that students are enrolled at 
a university—to satisfy graduation requirements, includ-
ing in many cases the satisfactory completion of service 
in a student assistant position.  And in some cases in-
volving student assistants, it is predictable that break-
downs in collective bargaining will occur, and the result-
ing resort to economic weapons may have devastating 
consequences for the students, including, potentially, 
inability to graduate after paying $50,000 to $100,000 or 
more for the opportunity to earn a degree.36
Now that, with today’s decision, student assistants are 
employees under the NLRA, what economic weapons are 
available to student assistants and the universities they 
attend?  They would almost certainly include the follow-
ing:
 Strikes.  Student assistants could go on strike, 
which would mean that Teaching Assistants, 
Teaching Fellows, Preceptors, Course Assistants, 
Readers, Graders, Graduate Research Assistants 
and Departmental Research Assistants would 
cease working, potentially without notice, and the 
university could suspend all remuneration.37  
                                                                          
one or both parties arise with regularity under our statute.  I have no 
quarrel with the notion that colleges and universities should construc-
tively engage with their students, including student assistants, in a 
variety of ways.  Yet I believe such engagement need not necessarily 
take the form of collective bargaining under the NLRA and instead may 
take place (and, I am sure, has taken place and is taking place) “without 
the intervention of the Board enforcing a statutory requirement.”  First 
National Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666, 681 fn. 19 (1981). 
36 The College Board reports that average annual tuition and fees at a 
private four-year college total $32,410, which means that four years’ 
worth of average tuition and fees total $129,640 at private universities.  
See https://bigfuture.collegeboard.org/pay-for-college/college-
costs/college-costs-faqs (last viewed July 29, 2016).  If a college career 
stretches to six years, which is the most common time period used to 
evaluate whether incoming students will graduate from a four-year 
college (see fn. 3, supra and accompanying text), average tuition and 
fees at a private university would total $194,460.  These figures do not 
include additional expenditures for room, board, and other living ex-
penses.   
37 In the event of a strike or lockout, an employer under the NLRA 
has the right to discontinue all wages and other forms of remuneration, 
with the sole exception of those wages or benefits that have already 
accrued, the payment of which does not depend on the performance of 
work.  See Texaco, Inc., 285 NLRB 241, 245 (1987) (“[A]n employer 
is not required to finance a strike against itself by paying wages or 
similar expenses dependent on the continuing performance of services 
 Lockouts.  The university could implement a lock-
out, which would require student assistants to 
cease working, and all remuneration would be 
suspended.  
 Loss, Suspension or Delay of Academic Credit.  If 
a student assistant ceases work based on an eco-
nomic strike or lockout, it appears clear they 
would have no entitlement to credit for require-
ments that are not completed, such as satisfactory 
work in a student assistant position for a pre-
scribed period of time.   For example, if a particu-
lar degree required two semesters of service as a 
Teaching Assistant, and a student assistant could 
not satisfy that requirement because of a strike or 
lockout that persisted for two semesters, it appears 
clear the student assistant would not be entitled to 
receive his or her degree.  
 Suspension of Tuition Waivers.  In the event of a 
strike or lockout where the university suspended 
tuition waivers or other financial assistance that 
was conditioned on the student’s work as a student 
assistant, students would likely be foreclosed from 
attending classes unless they paid the tuition.  
Thus, the student assistant’s attendance at universi-
ty could require the immediate payment of tuition, 
which averages $32,410 annually at private uni-
versities.38  
 Potential Replacement.  In the event of a strike, the 
university would have the right to hire temporary 
or permanent replacements.  If permanent re-
placements were hired during an economic strike, 
this would mean that even if a student uncondi-
tionally offered to resume working at the end of 
the strike, the university could retain the replace-
ments, and the student assistant would not be rein-
stated unless and until a vacancy arose through the 
departure of a replacement or the creation of a new 
position.  Here as well, one would expect that the 
student would be required to pay full tuition in or-
der to be permitted to attend classes, without re-
gard to whatever tuition waiver or other financial 
aid was previously provided in consideration of 
the student’s services as a student assistant.  Simi-
larly, any failure to satisfy degree requirements as-
sociated with a student assistant’s work as a stu-
dent assistant would preclude attainment of the 
degree.  
                                                                          
for the employer,” absent proof that the benefits in question were “ac-
crued,” which means “due and payable on the date on which the em-
ployer denied [them].”).  See also Ace Tank & Heater Co., 167 NLRB 
663, 664 (1967).
38 See fn. 33, supra.
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 Loss of Tuition Previously Paid.  If a student assis-
tant paid his or her own tuition (again, currently 
averaging $32,410 per year at a private universi-
ty)39 and only received a cash stipend as compen-
sation for work as a student assistant, there appears 
to be little question that the student’s tuition could 
lawfully be retained by the university even if a 
strike by student assistants persisted for an entire 
year, during which time the student was unable to 
satisfy any requirements for satisfactory work in 
his or her student assistant position.
 Misconduct, Potential Discharge, Academic Sus-
pension/Expulsion Disputes.  During and after a 
strike, employees remain subject to discipline or 
discharge for certain types of strike-related mis-
conduct.  Correspondingly, there is little question 
that a student assistant engaged in a strike would 
remain subject to academic discipline, including 
possible suspension or expulsion, for a variety of 
offenses.  In such cases, I anticipate that parties 
will initiate Board proceedings alleging that stu-
dents were unlawfully suspended or expelled for 
NLRA-protected activity, even though nothing in 
the Act permits the Board to devise remedies that 
relate to an individual’s academic standing, sepa-
rate and apart from his or her “employment.”   
It is also a mistake to assume that today’s decision re-
lates only to the creation of collective-bargaining rights.  
Our statute involves wide-ranging requirements and ob-
ligations.  For example, existing Board cases require em-
ployers subject to the NLRA to tolerate actions by em-
ployees that most reasonable people would find objec-
tionable, and it is unlawful for employers to adopt overly 
broad work rules to promote respect and civility by em-
ployees.  Therefore, parents take heed:  if you send your 
teenage sons or daughters to college, the Board majori-
ty’s decision today will affect their “college experience” 
in the following ways: 
 Non-Confidential Investigations.  If your son or 
daughter is sexually harassed by a student assistant 
and an investigation by the university ensues, the 
university will violate federal law (the NLRA) if it 
routinely asks other student-assistant witnesses to 
keep confidential what is discussed during the uni-
versity’s investigation.40  
                                               
39 See fn. 33, supra.
40 See, e.g., Banner Estrella Medical Center, supra, 362 NLRB No. 
137.  These disclosures, though required by the NLRB, may directly 
conflict with nondisclosure obligations under the Family Educational 
Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA).  See fn. 29, supra.
 Witness Statement Disclosure.  In the above ex-
ample, witness statements submitted by your son 
or daughter about sexual harassment by a student 
assistant must be disclosed to the union, unless (i) 
the university can prove that the statement’s sub-
mission was conditioned on confidentiality, and 
(ii) even then, the statement must be disclosed un-
less the university can prove that your son or 
daughter needs protection, or other circumstances 
outweigh the union’s need for the witness state-
ment.41
 Invalidating Rules Promoting Civility.  The uni-
versity will be found to have violated the NLRA if 
it requires student assistants to maintain “harmoni-
ous interactions and relationships” with other stu-
dents.42
 Invalidating Rules Barring Profanity and Abuse. 
The university cannot adopt a policy against “loud, 
abusive or foul language” or “false, vicious, pro-
fane or malicious statements” by student assis-
tants.43
 Outrageous Conduct by Student Assistants.  The 
university must permit student assistants to have 
angry confrontations with university officials in 
grievance discussions, and the student assistant 
cannot be lawfully disciplined or removed from 
his or her position even if he or she repeatedly 
screams, “I can say anything I want,” “I can swear 
if I want,” and “I can do anything I want, and you 
can’t stop me.”44
 Outrageous Social Media Postings by Student As-
sistants. If a student assistant objects to actions by 
a professor-supervisor named “Bob,” the universi-
ty must permit the student to post a message on 
Facebook stating:  “Bob is such a nasty mother 
fucker, don’t know how to talk to people.  Fuck 
his mother and his entire fucking family.”45
 Disrespect and Profanity Directed to Faculty Su-
pervisors.  The university may not take action 
against a student assistant who screams at a pro-
fessor-supervisor and calls him a “fucking crook,” 
a “fucking mother fucking” and an “asshole” when 
                                               
41 See, e.g., Piedmont Gardens, supra, 362 NLRB No. 139.  These 
disclosures, though required by the NLRB, may also directly conflict
with nondisclosure obligations under FERPA.  See fn. 29, supra.
42 See, e.g., William Beaumont Hospital, 363 NLRB No. 162 (2016); 
2 Sisters Food Group, 357 NLRB 1816 (2011).
43 See Flamingo Hilton-Laughlin, 330 NLRB 287 (1999); Lafayette 
Park Hotel, 326 NLRB 825 (1998), enfd. 203 F.3d 52 (D.C. Cir. 1999); 
Cincinnati Suburban Press, Inc., 289 NLRB 966, 975 (1988).
44 See United States Postal Service, 364 NLRB No. 62 (2016).
45 See Pier Sixty, LLC, 362 NLRB No. 59 (2015).
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the student assistant is complaining about the 
treatment of student assistants.46  
The above examples constitute a small sampling of the 
unfortunate consequences that will predictably follow 
from the majority’s decision to apply our statute to stu-
dent assistants at colleges and universities.  The primary 
purpose of a university is to educate students, and the 
Board should not disregard that purpose in finding that 
student assistants are employees and therefore subject to 
all provisions of the NLRA.
2.  The Board’s Processes and Procedures Are Incom-
patible with Applying the Act to University Student Assis-
tants.  Another frailty associated with applying the 
NLRA to student assistants at universities relates to the 
cumbersome and time-consuming nature of the Board’s 
processes and procedures, which makes those processes 
and procedures especially ill suited to students in a uni-
versity setting. 
The Board has engaged in well-publicized efforts to 
expedite the handling of representation cases, and in 
2014 the Board issued an election rule that dramatically 
revised the Agency’s representation-case procedures.  
See 79 Fed. Reg. 74, 308 (2014) (Election Rule).  How-
ever, notwithstanding the Board’s commitment to resolve 
representation cases as quickly as possible, doing so has 
sometimes proven difficult in cases involving colleges 
and universities.  In part, these difficulties and resulting 
delays are owing to the fact that the religious affiliation 
of a college or university may entirely preclude the 
Board’s exercise of jurisdiction.47  However, even when 
representation cases involve universities that are not reli-
giously affiliated, Board proceedings may still involve 
significant time, and the filing of election-related unfair 
labor practice charges may delay scheduled elections for 
months or years under the Agency’s “blocking charge” 
doctrine.48
The Board’s handling of alleged unfair labor practices 
(ULPs) takes even more time.  Our procedures require 
                                               
46 See Plaza Auto Center, Inc., 360 NLRB No. 117 (2014).
47 See, e.g., Seattle University, 364 NLRB No. 84 (2016) (represen-
tation proceedings involving religiously affiliated university where 
representation petition was filed February 20, 2014, and the Board’s 
decision issued on August 23, 2016); St. Xavier University, 364 NLRB 
No. 85 (2016) (representation proceedings involving religiously affili-
ated university where representation petition was filed April 12, 2011, 
and the Board’s decision issued on August 23, 2016); Duquesne Uni-
versity, Case 6-RC-80933 (representation proceedings involving reli-
giously affiliated university where representation petition was filed 
May 14, 2012 and remains pending before the Board).  See generally 
Pacific Lutheran University, 361 NLRB No. 157 (2014).
48 The Board’s treatment of delays associated with blocking charges 
was not materially changed in the Election Rule.  See 79 Fed. Reg. at 
74,455–74,456 (dissenting views of Members Miscimarra and John-
son).
the filing of a ULP charge, which is investigated by one 
of the Board’s regional offices, which decides whether to 
issue a complaint, and if complaint issues, this is fol-
lowed by a hearing before an administrative law judge, 
with posthearing briefing in most cases.  After the judge 
issues a decision, parties have the right to file exceptions 
to that decision with the Board (in other words, they may 
appeal), with further briefing by the parties.  Ultimately, 
the Board renders a decision, which may be appealed to a 
federal court of appeals.  In addition, when the Board has 
found a violation and has ordered backpay and other re-
medial measures, there are additional compliance pro-
ceedings handled by the Board’s regional offices, which 
can result in additional hearings before administrative 
law judges, additional posthearing briefs, supplemental 
decisions by the judges, and further appeals to the Board 
and the courts.  In spite of everyone’s best efforts, this 
lengthy litigation process consumes substantial time and 
too often causes unacceptable delays before any Board-
ordered relief becomes available to the parties.  Unfair 
labor practice cases may easily be litigated for three to 
five years before the Board issues a decision, and some 
cases take even longer.  See, e.g., CNN America, Inc., 
361 NLRB No. 47 (2014) (alleged ULPs requiring 82 
days of trial, more than 1,300 exhibits, more than 16,000 
transcript pages, and more than 10 years of Board litiga-
tion, and the case still remains pending on appeal); 
Dubuque Packing Co., 287 NLRB 499 (1987), remanded 
sub nom. UFCW Local 150-A v. NLRB, 880 F.2d 1422 
(D.C. Cir. 1989), on remand 303 NLRB 386 (1991), 
enfd. in relevant part sub nom. UFCW Local 150-A v. 
NLRB, 1 F.3d 24 (D.C. Cir. 1993), cert. granted 511 U.S. 
1016 (1994), cert. dismissed 511 U.S. 1138 (1994) (al-
leged ULPs requiring 13 years of Board and court litiga-
tion).49
In the time it takes a typical NLRA case to be litigated 
and decided by the Board and the courts, the academic 
world may experience developments that dramatically 
change or even eliminate entire fields of study.  Moreo-
ver, not only does a student assistant’s position have a 
fixed duration, but the student status of the individual 
                                               
49 Sec. 10(j) of the NLRA authorizes the Board’s General Counsel to 
initiate proceedings in federal district court seeking interim injunctive 
relief in certain cases, but the ultimate resolution of those disputes does 
not occur until the Board’s disposition on the merits (subject to further 
appellate review).  Moreover, the General Counsel is necessarily selec-
tive when evaluating whether particular cases warrant efforts to seek 
Sec. 10(j) relief, and there is no certainty that such relief, when sought, 
will be granted by the court.  See, e.g., Osthus v. Ingredion, Inc., Case 
No. 16-CV-38-LRR, 2016 WL 4098541 (N.D. Iowa July 28, 2016) 
(denying Sec. 10(j) petition on the basis that the Board “failed to meet 
its burden to demonstrate that irreparable injury is likely to occur ab-
sent injunctive relief”). 
31
et al.: Panel: Graduate Student Employees - Collective Bargaining After t
Published by The Keep, 2017
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD32
occupying that position may itself come to an end long 
before a Board case affecting him or her is resolved.  
Students generally attend university for the purpose of 
doing something else—i.e., to obtain post-graduation
employment, or to go on to post-doctoral or other post-
graduate studies.  Moreover, it is not uncommon for stu-
dents to change majors, and faculty members also come 
and go.  In these respects, treating student assistants as 
employees under the NLRA is especially poorly matched 
to the Board’s representation and ULP procedures.50  
3.  Other Considerations Undermine the Appropriate-
ness of the Petitioned-For Bargaining Unit.  I believe the 
Board should find that student assistants are not employ-
ees for purposes of Section 2(3) of the Act.  Therefore, I 
need not reach whether the bargaining unit sought in the 
instant case is an appropriate bargaining unit.  Nonethe-
less, I will address two considerations that render the 
petitioned-for unit particularly problematic.
Preliminarily, however, I address an issue that is prior 
to appropriate-unit considerations:  the majority’s deci-
sion to reject not only Brown University but an unbroken, 
decades-old line of precedent holding that research assis-
tants are not employees under Section 2(3) of the Act.  
Research assistants are graduate students, usually in the 
hard sciences, who conduct research projects funded by 
private institutions or the government, and Columbia 
requires this research to be directly related to the research 
officer’s dissertation.  The Board has consistently de-
clined to find student research assistants to be employees 
under the Act.  In Adelphi University, the Board declined 
to include graduate student research assistants in a unit of 
regular faculty on the basis that the research assistants 
were “primarily students,” 195 NLRB at 640, and it dis-
tinguished student research assistants from a research 
assistant deemed eligible in another case who “was not 
                                               
50 At various points, my colleagues analogize student assistants to in-
termittent workers, “seasonal” workers, and “workforces . . . with sig-
nificant turnover.”  These analogies fail to reflect substantial differ-
ences that exist between conventional employees whose work may be 
sporadic and student assistants.  Even if conventional employees per-
form sporadic work, their employment most often contemplates that 
they will remain in the workforce, often in the same line of work and 
with the same employer.  Student assistants nearly always occupy their 
positions on a short-term basis, with plans to permanently abandon 
their status as student assistants to complete their education, graduate, 
and obtain other positions.  (My colleagues admit as much, noting that 
“student assistants possess a long-term goal of achieving employment 
elsewhere.”  Majority opinion, supra, slip op. at 21 fn. 131).  This is 
merely one additional reason that the Act is such an imperfect fit for 
student assistants.  See Saga Food Service, 212 NLRB 786, 787 fn. 9 
(1974) (finding a unit comprised solely of part-time student cafeteria 
workers would not “effectuate the purposes of the Act” “[i]n view of 
the nature of their employment tenure and our conclusion that their 
primary concern is their studies rather than their part-time employ-
ment”).
simultaneously a student but already had his doctoral 
degree,” id. at 640 fn. 8.  Similarly, in Leland Stanford 
Junior University, 214 NLRB at 621, the Board again 
concluded that student research assistants “are primarily 
students [and] not employees.”  Id. at 623.  Even during 
the brief period when the Board considered student in-
structors to be employees under the Act, the Board ad-
hered to precedent holding that student research assis-
tants are not Section 2(3) employees.  See NYU, 332 
NLRB at 1209 fn. 10 (applying Leland Stanford and 
finding that student research assistants were not employ-
ees); see also Brown, 342 NLRB at 483 (graduate student 
assistants, including research assistants, are not employ-
ees under Section 2(3) of the Act).  
The facts regarding the research officers here differ in 
no material respect from those of the student research 
assistants in Leland Stanford, NYU, and Brown.  Here, as 
in each of those cases, the students perform research as 
part of their progress towards a degree and are primarily 
students.  Accordingly, based on a line of precedent that 
remained unbroken for more than 40 years, I believe the 
Board cannot reasonably find that research assistants are 
employees for purposes of the Act.
Turning to appropriate-unit considerations, I believe 
the Board cannot find that the broad array of student as-
sistants here share a sufficient community of interests to 
warrant their inclusion in a single bargaining unit.  The 
Petitioner seeks to represent all “student employees” who 
engage in “instructional services,” including “graduate 
and undergraduate Teaching Assistants,” “Teaching Fel-
lows,” “Preceptors,” “Course Assistants,” “Readers,” 
“Graders,” “Graduate Research Assistants” and “De-
partmental Research Assistants.”  The students within the 
various classifications in the petitioned-for unit vary con-
siderably in terms of their duties, levels of responsibility, 
remuneration, and expected length of service.  Although 
I would decline jurisdiction over the entire proposed unit 
on the basis that student assistants are not “employees,” 
and therefore I need not and do not reach or analyze the 
various issues relating to whether the proposed unit is 
appropriate, the evidence in the record demonstrates that 
what various student officers do and how they are remu-
nerated vary enormously.
For example, some student assistants teach, and re-
search assistants perform research.  Course assistants do 
neither:  they perform clerical duties, such as filing and 
copying, to help faculty administer courses.  Generally, 
doctoral students have greater autonomy and responsibil-
ity in performing their instructional duties than do mas-
ter’s degree candidates and undergraduates.  Some doc-
toral students serve as preceptors, fully designing and 
implementing their own courses.  By contrast, non-
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doctoral students predominantly grade papers or provide 
tutoring to their fellow students in laboratory or discus-
sion sections.  
Course assistants perform work that is intermittent in 
nature, and they are paid from Columbia’s casual payroll.  
Remuneration for master’s degree students and under-
graduates is awarded only during the semesters that the 
students actually perform duties as student assistants.  By 
contrast, doctoral students receive the same funding dur-
ing the entire time spent pursuing their degree, whether 
they are performing duties as a student assistant during a 
certain semester or academic year or not.  In contrast to 
the intermittent tenure of the course assistants, doctoral 
students generally must spend at least one year teaching, 
and sometimes multiple years, in order to obtain their 
degree.  Undergraduate and master’s degree students are 
not required to serve as student assistants in connection 
with their degree requirements.  
In view of these and other fundamental dissimilarities, 
I believe the petitioned-for unit would likely be inappro-
priate under any community-of-interest test, including 
the one stated in Specialty Healthcare.51
The second consideration that, in my view, undermines 
the appropriateness of the petitioned-for unit relates to 
the Board’s treatment of temporary employees, who are 
generally excluded from petitioned-for bargaining units.  
Here, I disagree with my colleagues’ evaluation of the 
student assistants “as a group” and their application of a 
special rule to all of them—namely, that their tenure “is 
not so ephemeral as to vitiate their interest in bargaining 
over terms and conditions of employment.”52  This 
standard inappropriately deviates from the Board’s exist-
ing principles pertaining to temporary employees by cre-
ating a special rule for them.  See, e.g., Fordham Univer-
sity, 214 NLRB 971, 975 (1974) (rejecting creation of a 
special rule for temporary employee status governing 
                                               
51 See Specialty Healthcare & Rehabilitation Center of Mobile, 357 
NLRB 934, 942 (2011) (citing, among the factors the Board must ex-
amine to determine if a unit is appropriate, “whether the employees are 
organized into a separate department; have distinct skills and training; 
have distinct job functions and perform distinct work, including inquiry 
into the amount and type of job overlap between classifications; . . . 
have distinct terms and conditions of employment; and are separately 
supervised”) (citations omitted); see also NYU, 332 NLRB at 1205 fn. 
5, 1209 fn. 10 (excluding research assistants funded by external grants 
and students who acted as graders and tutors from a unit of graduate 
assistants).
Specialty Healthcare does not govern the appropriateness of the pe-
titioned-for unit in this case because there is no argument that the peti-
tioned-for unit inappropriately excludes other putative employees.  In 
any event, however, I would not apply Specialty Healthcare for the 
reasons stated in my dissenting opinion in Macy’s, Inc., 361 NLRB No. 
4, slip op. at 31–33 (2014) (Member Miscimarra, dissenting).
52 Majority opinion, supra, slip op. at 21.
faculty in academia).  The Board has recognized that 
short-term or finite employment may not be conclusive 
as to temporary status, but it may nonetheless require a 
finding that certain members of a petitioned-for unit do 
not share a community of interests with the rest of the 
unit.  Compare Boston Medical Center, 330 NLRB at 
166 (finding appropriate a unit of house staff, where all 
employees in the proposed unit were generally employed 
by the employer for 3 to 7 years) with Goddard College, 
216 NLRB 457, 458 (1975) (excluding from a unit of 
full-time faculty visiting faculty who generally stay for 
only one semester or one year).  Regarding the peti-
tioned-for unit in this case, I do not believe the Board can 
appropriately recognize a single bargaining unit that 
combines course assistants who work a few intermittent 
hours with doctoral candidates who may teach for several 
years.  
CONCLUSION
There is a remarkable, life-changing procedure availa-
ble for those fortunate enough to undergo it.  During this 
procedure, the participants remain awake, they are close-
ly evaluated while answering complex questions for an 
extended period of time, and they are monitored while 
performing other tasks as directed, which includes inter-
acting with others.  This life-changing procedure is 
enormously expensive, and many individuals receive 
financial assistance while undergoing it.  The procedure 
is so demanding that many participants never complete 
it.  Yet, research shows that successful completion of the 
procedure improves the rest of the person’s life.  It pro-
duces substantially more opportunities, higher compensa-
tion, enhanced satisfaction, and greater upward mobility 
both for the participants and for future generations.
This describes the role played by colleges and univer-
sities in the United States.  My colleagues apply a dis-
torted and highly selective lens to this life-changing pro-
cedure.  Dismissing everything else as “not dispositive,” 
they conclude that some participants satisfy the defini-
tion of an “employee” because (i) they perform tasks as 
directed, and (ii) they receive financial assistance.  Even 
more erroneous, in my view, is the notion that public 
policy favors taking participants who are trying to com-
plete this life-changing procedure and—while it is being 
conducted—having them engage in collective bargain-
ing, which is governed by leverage and the potential 
clash of economic interests. It will wreak havoc 
to have economic weapons wielded by or against partici-
pants during this expensive procedure, especially since 
the weapons include strikes and lockouts—which 
can stop the procedure in its tracks—and the permanent 
replacement of the participants themselves!  
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The Board has a responsibility to acknowledge the 
enormous complexity, demands and benefits associated 
with every student’s potential graduation from a college 
and university.  In particular, I believe my colleagues 
improperly focus on the NLRA and “wholly ignore other 
and equally important Congressional objectives,”53 espe-
cially the overriding importance of facilitating each stu-
dent’s satisfaction of degree requirements.  Given the 
importance of this policy objective—which is reflected 
in numerous federal statutes and regulations governing 
education, and as to which the Board has no expertise—I 
believe the Board cannot reasonably apply our statute to 
student assistants at colleges and universities “without a 
clear expression of an affirmative intention of Con-
gress.”54  No such evidence of Congressional intent ex-
ists.     
“The ‘business’ of a university is education,”55 and 
students are not the means of production—they are the 
“product.”  Their successful completion of degree re-
quirements results from the combined commitment of 
faculty, administrators, and the students’ own academic 
efforts.  It is true that the Board has asserted jurisdiction 
over faculty members in private, non-exempt colleges 
and universities, notwithstanding the significant differ-
ences that exist between the academic and industrial 
worlds.56  In my view, however, obstacles to fitting the 
square peg of the NLRA into the round hole of academia 
become insuperable when the petitioned-for “employees” 
are university student assistants.  
                                               
53 Southern Steamship Co. v. NLRB, 316 U.S. at 47.
54 Catholic Bishop, 440 U.S. at 504.
55 Yeshiva, 444 U.S. at 686.
56 C.W. Post Center, 189 NLRB 904 (1971) (faculty members are 
professional employees who may bargain collectively).
The question here is not whether colleges and universi-
ties should constructively engage their students, includ-
ing student assistants, in a variety of ways.57  The ques-
tion is whether Congress intended—and whether our 
statute can be reasonably interpreted—to make the 
NLRA govern the relationship between students and 
their universities merely because students may occupy a 
variety of academic positions in connection with their 
education.  As noted above, for most students including 
student assistants, attending college is the most important 
investment they will ever make.  I do not believe our 
statute contemplates that it should be governed by bar-
gaining leverage, the potential resort to economic weap-
ons, and the threat or infliction of economic injury by or 
against students, on the one hand, and colleges and uni-
versities, on the other.    
For these reasons, and consistent with the Board’s pri-
or holding in Brown University, I believe the Board 
should find that the relationship between Columbia and 
the student assistants in the petitioned-for unit in this 
matter is primarily educational, and that student assis-
tants are not employees under Section 2(3) of the Act.  
Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
Dated, Washington, D.C.  August 23, 2016
______________________________________
Philip A. Miscimarra,              Member
                        NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
                                               
57 See fn. 35, supra.
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